Linus Torvalds
1eccfa090e
Implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1
Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>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=USIR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook:
"Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and
copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and
SLUB"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
mm: Hardened usercopy
mm: Implement stack frame object validation
mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
|
2016-08-08 14:48:14 -07:00 |
| .. |
|
apparmor
|
apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
|
2016-07-27 17:39:26 +10:00 |
|
integrity
|
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
|
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00 |
|
keys
|
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
|
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00 |
|
loadpin
|
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
|
2016-05-17 20:10:30 +10:00 |
|
selinux
|
Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
|
2016-08-06 09:49:02 -04:00 |
|
smack
|
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
|
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00 |
|
tomoyo
|
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
|
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00 |
|
yama
|
Yama: fix double-spinlock and user access in atomic context
|
2016-05-26 09:56:18 +10:00 |
|
commoncap.c
|
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
|
2016-06-24 10:40:41 -05:00 |
|
device_cgroup.c
|
security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition
|
2015-09-03 18:13:10 -07:00 |
|
inode.c
|
securityfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
|
2016-05-29 16:22:06 -04:00 |
|
Kconfig
|
mm: Hardened usercopy
|
2016-07-26 14:41:47 -07:00 |
|
lsm_audit.c
|
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next
|
2015-08-15 13:29:57 +10:00 |
|
Makefile
|
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
|
2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00 |
|
min_addr.c
|
mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write
|
2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00 |
|
security.c
|
Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
|
2016-08-06 09:49:02 -04:00 |