android_kernel_sony_sdm845/include/linux/refcount.h
Peter Zijlstra f12e55866d BACKPORT: locking/refcount: Create unchecked atomic_t implementation
Many subsystems will not use refcount_t unless there is a way to build the
kernel so that there is no regression in speed compared to atomic_t. This
adds CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL to enable the full refcount_t implementation
which has the validation but is slightly slower. When not enabled,
refcount_t uses the basic unchecked atomic_t routines, which results in
no code changes compared to just using atomic_t directly.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621200026.GA115679@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Add missing kernel.h header to have UINT_MAX defined

Fix header dependency.

Suggested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487855374-21993-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1489160052-20293-1-git-send-email-dwindsor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Change WARN() to WARN_ONCE()

Linus noticed that the new refcount.h APIs used WARN(), which would turn
into a dmesg DoS if it triggers frequently on some buggy driver.

So make sure we only warn once. These warnings are never supposed to happen,
so it's typically not a problem to lose subsequent warnings.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzbYUTZ=oqZ2YgDjY0C2_n6ODhTfqj6V+m5xWmDxsuB0w@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Use atomic_try_cmpxchg()

Generates better code (GCC-6.2.1):

  text        filename
  1576        defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.pre
  1488        defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.post

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: refcount: change EXPORT_SYMBOL markings

Now that kref is using the refcount apis, the _GPL markings are getting
exported to places that it previously wasn't.  Now kref.h is GPLv2
licensed, so any non-GPL code using it better be talking to some
lawyers, but changing api markings isn't considered "nice", so let's fix
this up.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything
Linus asked to please make this real C code.

And since size then isn't an issue what so ever anymore, remove the
debug knob and make all WARN()s unconditional.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dwindsor@gmail.com
Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: ishkamiel@gmail.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Remove the half-implemented refcount_sub() API

CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y (correctly) does not provide a refcount_sub(),
which should not be part of proper refcount design patterns.

Remove the erroneous extern and the later !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL
accidental implementation.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 29dee3c03abc ("locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170701180129.GA17405@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection

This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.

This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.

Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:

  http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/

  http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016

This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.

On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).

On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.

As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.

Example assembly comparison:

refcount_inc() before:

  .text:
  ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)

refcount_inc() after:

  .text:
  ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
  ffffffff8154614d:       0f 88 80 d5 17 00       js     ffffffff816c36d3
  ...
  .text.unlikely:
  ffffffff816c36d3:       48 8d 4d f4             lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
  ffffffff816c36d7:       0f ff                   (bad)

These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):

  2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
		    cycles		protections
  atomic_t           82249267387	none
  refcount_t-fast    82211446892	overflow, untested dec-to-zero
  refcount_t-full   144814735193	overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero

This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Implement refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave()

There are in-tree users of refcount_dec_and_lock() which must acquire the
spin lock with interrupts disabled. To workaround the lack of an irqsave
variant of refcount_dec_and_lock() they use local_irq_save() at the call
site. This causes extra code and creates in some places unneeded long
interrupt disabled times. These places need also extra treatment for
PREEMPT_RT due to the disconnect of the irq disabling and the lock
function.

Implement the missing irqsave variant of the function.

Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r20180612161621.22645-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de

[bigeasy: s@atomic_dec_and_lock@refcount_dec_and_lock@g]

UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Include fewer headers in <linux/refcount.h>

Debloat <linux/refcount.h>'s dependencies:

- <linux/kernel.h> is not needed, but <linux/compiler.h> is.
- <linux/mutex.h> is not needed, only a forward declaration of "struct mutex".
- <linux/spinlock.h> is not needed, <linux/spinlock_types.h> is enough.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20180331220036.GA7676@avx2
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Always allow checked forms

In many cases, it would be useful to be able to use the full
sanity-checked refcount helpers regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL,
as this would help to avoid duplicate warnings where callers try to
sanity-check refcount manipulation.

This patch refactors things such that the full refcount helpers were
always built, as refcount_${op}_checked(), such that they can be used
regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL. This will allow code which *always*
wants a checked refcount to opt-in, avoiding the need to duplicate the
logic for warnings.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711093607.1644-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg()

Add a new cmpxchg interface:

  bool try_cmpxchg(u{8,16,32,64} *ptr, u{8,16,32,64} *val, u{8,16,32,64} new);

Where the boolean returns the result of the compare; and thus if the
exchange happened; and in case of failure, the new value of *ptr is
returned in *val.

This allows simplification/improvement of loops like:

	for (;;) {
		new = val $op $imm;
		old = cmpxchg(ptr, val, new);
		if (old == val)
			break;
		val = old;
	}

into:

	do {
	} while (!try_cmpxchg(ptr, &val, val $op $imm));

while also generating better code (GCC6 and onwards).

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Fix atomic_try_cmpxchg() semantics

Dmitry noted that the new atomic_try_cmpxchg() primitive is broken when
the old pointer doesn't point to the local stack.

He writes:

  "Consider a classical lock-free stack push:

    node->next = atomic_read(&head);
    do {
    } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&head, &node->next, node));

  This code is broken with the current implementation, the problem is
  with unconditional update of *__po.

  In case of success it writes the same value back into *__po, but in
  case of cmpxchg success we might have lose ownership of some memory
  locations and potentially over what __po has pointed to. The same
  holds for the re-read of *__po. "

He also points out that this makes it surprisingly different from the
similar C/C++ atomic operation.

After investigating the code-gen differences caused by this patch; and
a number of alternatives (Linus dislikes this interface lots), we
arrived at these results (size x86_64-defconfig/vmlinux):

  GCC-6.3.0:

  10735757        cmpxchg
  10726413        try_cmpxchg
  10730509        try_cmpxchg + patch
  10730445        try_cmpxchg-linus

  GCC-7 (20170327):

  10709514        cmpxchg
  10704266        try_cmpxchg
  10704266        try_cmpxchg + patch
  10704394        try_cmpxchg-linus

From this we see that the patch has the advantage of better code-gen
on GCC-7 and keeps the interface roughly consistent with the C
language variant.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a9ebf306f52c ("locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg()")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
2026-05-15 17:54:59 +07:00

117 lines
3.1 KiB
C

#ifndef _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H
#define _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
struct mutex;
/**
* refcount_t - variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts
* @refs: atomic_t counter field
*
* The counter saturates at UINT_MAX and will not move once
* there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious'
* use-after-free bugs.
*/
typedef struct refcount_struct {
atomic_t refs;
} refcount_t;
#define REFCOUNT_INIT(n) { .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), }
/**
* refcount_set - set a refcount's value
* @r: the refcount
* @n: value to which the refcount will be set
*/
static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, unsigned int n)
{
atomic_set(&r->refs, n);
}
/**
* refcount_read - get a refcount's value
* @r: the refcount
*
* Return: the refcount's value
*/
static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r)
{
return atomic_read(&r->refs);
}
extern __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
extern void refcount_add_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
extern __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r);
extern void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r);
extern __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r);
extern void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r);
#ifdef CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL
#define refcount_add_not_zero refcount_add_not_zero_checked
#define refcount_add refcount_add_checked
#define refcount_inc_not_zero refcount_inc_not_zero_checked
#define refcount_inc refcount_inc_checked
#define refcount_sub_and_test refcount_sub_and_test_checked
#define refcount_dec_and_test refcount_dec_and_test_checked
#define refcount_dec refcount_dec_checked
#else
# ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
# include <asm/refcount.h>
# else
static inline __must_check bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
{
return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, i, 0);
}
static inline void refcount_add(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
{
atomic_add(i, &r->refs);
}
static inline __must_check bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r)
{
return atomic_add_unless(&r->refs, 1, 0);
}
static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r)
{
atomic_inc(&r->refs);
}
static inline __must_check bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
{
return atomic_sub_and_test(i, &r->refs);
}
static inline __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r)
{
return atomic_dec_and_test(&r->refs);
}
static inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
{
atomic_dec(&r->refs);
}
# endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT */
#endif /* CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL */
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r);
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r);
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(refcount_t *r, struct mutex *lock);
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_lock(refcount_t *r, spinlock_t *lock);
extern __must_check bool refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave(refcount_t *r,
spinlock_t *lock,
unsigned long *flags);
#endif /* _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H */