Many subsystems will not use refcount_t unless there is a way to build the kernel so that there is no regression in speed compared to atomic_t. This adds CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL to enable the full refcount_t implementation which has the validation but is slightly slower. When not enabled, refcount_t uses the basic unchecked atomic_t routines, which results in no code changes compared to just using atomic_t directly. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621200026.GA115679@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Add missing kernel.h header to have UINT_MAX defined Fix header dependency. Suggested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487855374-21993-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1489160052-20293-1-git-send-email-dwindsor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Change WARN() to WARN_ONCE() Linus noticed that the new refcount.h APIs used WARN(), which would turn into a dmesg DoS if it triggers frequently on some buggy driver. So make sure we only warn once. These warnings are never supposed to happen, so it's typically not a problem to lose subsequent warnings. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzbYUTZ=oqZ2YgDjY0C2_n6ODhTfqj6V+m5xWmDxsuB0w@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Use atomic_try_cmpxchg() Generates better code (GCC-6.2.1): text filename 1576 defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.pre 1488 defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.post Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: refcount: change EXPORT_SYMBOL markings Now that kref is using the refcount apis, the _GPL markings are getting exported to places that it previously wasn't. Now kref.h is GPLv2 licensed, so any non-GPL code using it better be talking to some lawyers, but changing api markings isn't considered "nice", so let's fix this up. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything Linus asked to please make this real C code. And since size then isn't an issue what so ever anymore, remove the debug knob and make all WARN()s unconditional. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dwindsor@gmail.com Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ishkamiel@gmail.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Remove the half-implemented refcount_sub() API CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y (correctly) does not provide a refcount_sub(), which should not be part of proper refcount design patterns. Remove the erroneous extern and the later !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL accidental implementation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 29dee3c03abc ("locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170701180129.GA17405@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely. Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable: http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016 This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent. On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated). On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine. Example assembly comparison: refcount_inc() before: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) refcount_inc() after: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3 ... .text.unlikely: ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad) These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast): 2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s: cycles protections atomic_t 82249267387 none refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Implement refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave() There are in-tree users of refcount_dec_and_lock() which must acquire the spin lock with interrupts disabled. To workaround the lack of an irqsave variant of refcount_dec_and_lock() they use local_irq_save() at the call site. This causes extra code and creates in some places unneeded long interrupt disabled times. These places need also extra treatment for PREEMPT_RT due to the disconnect of the irq disabling and the lock function. Implement the missing irqsave variant of the function. Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r20180612161621.22645-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de [bigeasy: s@atomic_dec_and_lock@refcount_dec_and_lock@g] UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Include fewer headers in <linux/refcount.h> Debloat <linux/refcount.h>'s dependencies: - <linux/kernel.h> is not needed, but <linux/compiler.h> is. - <linux/mutex.h> is not needed, only a forward declaration of "struct mutex". - <linux/spinlock.h> is not needed, <linux/spinlock_types.h> is enough. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20180331220036.GA7676@avx2 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Always allow checked forms In many cases, it would be useful to be able to use the full sanity-checked refcount helpers regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, as this would help to avoid duplicate warnings where callers try to sanity-check refcount manipulation. This patch refactors things such that the full refcount helpers were always built, as refcount_${op}_checked(), such that they can be used regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL. This will allow code which *always* wants a checked refcount to opt-in, avoiding the need to duplicate the logic for warnings. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711093607.1644-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg() Add a new cmpxchg interface: bool try_cmpxchg(u{8,16,32,64} *ptr, u{8,16,32,64} *val, u{8,16,32,64} new); Where the boolean returns the result of the compare; and thus if the exchange happened; and in case of failure, the new value of *ptr is returned in *val. This allows simplification/improvement of loops like: for (;;) { new = val $op $imm; old = cmpxchg(ptr, val, new); if (old == val) break; val = old; } into: do { } while (!try_cmpxchg(ptr, &val, val $op $imm)); while also generating better code (GCC6 and onwards). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Fix atomic_try_cmpxchg() semantics Dmitry noted that the new atomic_try_cmpxchg() primitive is broken when the old pointer doesn't point to the local stack. He writes: "Consider a classical lock-free stack push: node->next = atomic_read(&head); do { } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&head, &node->next, node)); This code is broken with the current implementation, the problem is with unconditional update of *__po. In case of success it writes the same value back into *__po, but in case of cmpxchg success we might have lose ownership of some memory locations and potentially over what __po has pointed to. The same holds for the re-read of *__po. " He also points out that this makes it surprisingly different from the similar C/C++ atomic operation. After investigating the code-gen differences caused by this patch; and a number of alternatives (Linus dislikes this interface lots), we arrived at these results (size x86_64-defconfig/vmlinux): GCC-6.3.0: 10735757 cmpxchg 10726413 try_cmpxchg 10730509 try_cmpxchg + patch 10730445 try_cmpxchg-linus GCC-7 (20170327): 10709514 cmpxchg 10704266 try_cmpxchg 10704266 try_cmpxchg + patch 10704394 try_cmpxchg-linus From this we see that the patch has the advantage of better code-gen on GCC-7 and keeps the interface roughly consistent with the C language variant. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a9ebf306f52c ("locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg()") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
378 lines
11 KiB
C
378 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Variant of atomic_t specialized for reference counts.
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*
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* The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only
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* provides the few functions one should use for reference counting.
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*
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* It differs in that the counter saturates at UINT_MAX and will not move once
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* there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious'
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* use-after-free issues.
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*
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* Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions
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* and provide only what is strictly required for refcounts.
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*
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* The increments are fully relaxed; these will not provide ordering. The
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* rationale is that whatever is used to obtain the object we're increasing the
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* reference count on will provide the ordering. For locked data structures,
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* its the lock acquire, for RCU/lockless data structures its the dependent
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* load.
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*
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* Do note that inc_not_zero() provides a control dependency which will order
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* future stores against the inc, this ensures we'll never modify the object
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* if we did not in fact acquire a reference.
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*
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* The decrements will provide release order, such that all the prior loads and
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* stores will be issued before, it also provides a control dependency, which
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* will order us against the subsequent free().
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*
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* The control dependency is against the load of the cmpxchg (ll/sc) that
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* succeeded. This means the stores aren't fully ordered, but this is fine
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* because the 1->0 transition indicates no concurrency.
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*
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* Note that the allocator is responsible for ordering things between free()
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* and alloc().
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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#include <linux/refcount.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock.h>
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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/**
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* refcount_add_not_zero_checked - add a value to a refcount unless it is 0
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* @i: the value to add to the refcount
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* @r: the refcount
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*
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* Will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
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*
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* Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the
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* object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency
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* and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top.
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*
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* Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting
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* use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these
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* cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to
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* increment a reference count.
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*
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* Return: false if the passed refcount is 0, true otherwise
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*/
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bool refcount_add_not_zero_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
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{
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unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
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do {
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if (!val)
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return false;
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if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX))
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return true;
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new = val + i;
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if (new < val)
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new = UINT_MAX;
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} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new));
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WARN_ONCE(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n");
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return true;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_not_zero_checked);
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/**
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* refcount_add_checked - add a value to a refcount
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* @i: the value to add to the refcount
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* @r: the refcount
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*
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* Similar to atomic_add(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
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*
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* Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the
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* object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency
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* and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top.
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*
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* Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting
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* use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these
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* cases, refcount_inc(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to
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* increment a reference count.
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*/
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void refcount_add_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
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{
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WARN_ONCE(!refcount_add_not_zero_checked(i, r), "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n");
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_add_checked);
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/**
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* refcount_inc_not_zero_checked - increment a refcount unless it is 0
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* @r: the refcount to increment
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*
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* Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
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*
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* Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the
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* object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency
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* and thereby orders future stores. See the comment on top.
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*
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* Return: true if the increment was successful, false otherwise
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*/
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bool refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(refcount_t *r)
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{
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unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
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do {
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new = val + 1;
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if (!val)
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return false;
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if (unlikely(!new))
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return true;
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} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, &val, new));
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WARN_ONCE(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n");
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return true;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_not_zero_checked);
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/**
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* refcount_inc_checked - increment a refcount
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* @r: the refcount to increment
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_inc(), but will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller already has a
|
|
* reference on the object.
|
|
*
|
|
* Will WARN if the refcount is 0, as this represents a possible use-after-free
|
|
* condition.
|
|
*/
|
|
void refcount_inc_checked(refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero_checked(r), "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_inc_checked);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_sub_and_test_checked - subtract from a refcount and test if it is 0
|
|
* @i: amount to subtract from the refcount
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), but it will WARN, return false and
|
|
* ultimately leak on underflow and will fail to decrement when saturated
|
|
* at UINT_MAX.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
|
|
* before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after.
|
|
* See the comment on top.
|
|
*
|
|
* Use of this function is not recommended for the normal reference counting
|
|
* use case in which references are taken and released one at a time. In these
|
|
* cases, refcount_dec(), or one of its variants, should instead be used to
|
|
* decrement a reference count.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_sub_and_test_checked(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
new = val - i;
|
|
if (new > val) {
|
|
WARN_ONCE(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, new));
|
|
|
|
return !new;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_sub_and_test_checked);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_and_test_checked - decrement a refcount and test if it is 0
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to
|
|
* decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
|
|
* before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after.
|
|
* See the comment on top.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_and_test_checked(refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
return refcount_sub_and_test_checked(1, r);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_test_checked);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_checked - decrement a refcount
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_dec(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to decrement
|
|
* when saturated at UINT_MAX.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
|
|
* before.
|
|
*/
|
|
void refcount_dec_checked(refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_ONCE(refcount_dec_and_test_checked(r), "refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_checked);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_if_one - decrement a refcount if it is 1
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
*
|
|
* No atomic_t counterpart, it attempts a 1 -> 0 transition and returns the
|
|
* success thereof.
|
|
*
|
|
* Like all decrement operations, it provides release memory order and provides
|
|
* a control dependency.
|
|
*
|
|
* It can be used like a try-delete operator; this explicit case is provided
|
|
* and not cmpxchg in generic, because that would allow implementing unsafe
|
|
* operations.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true if the resulting refcount is 0, false otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
int val = 1;
|
|
|
|
return atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_if_one);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_not_one - decrement a refcount if it is not 1
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
*
|
|
* No atomic_t counterpart, it decrements unless the value is 1, in which case
|
|
* it will return false.
|
|
*
|
|
* Was often done like: atomic_add_unless(&var, -1, 1)
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true if the decrement operation was successful, false otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
if (val == 1)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
new = val - 1;
|
|
if (new > val) {
|
|
WARN_ONCE(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, &val, new));
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_not_one);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock - return holding mutex if able to decrement
|
|
* refcount to 0
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
* @lock: the mutex to be locked
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail
|
|
* to decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
|
|
* before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after.
|
|
* See the comment on top.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true and hold mutex if able to decrement refcount to 0, false
|
|
* otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(refcount_t *r, struct mutex *lock)
|
|
{
|
|
if (refcount_dec_not_one(r))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(lock);
|
|
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(r)) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(lock);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_and_lock - return holding spinlock if able to decrement
|
|
* refcount to 0
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
* @lock: the spinlock to be locked
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to atomic_dec_and_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to
|
|
* decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
|
|
*
|
|
* Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
|
|
* before, and provides a control dependency such that free() must come after.
|
|
* See the comment on top.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true and hold spinlock if able to decrement refcount to 0, false
|
|
* otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_and_lock(refcount_t *r, spinlock_t *lock)
|
|
{
|
|
if (refcount_dec_not_one(r))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(lock);
|
|
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(r)) {
|
|
spin_unlock(lock);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_lock);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave - return holding spinlock with disabled
|
|
* interrupts if able to decrement refcount to 0
|
|
* @r: the refcount
|
|
* @lock: the spinlock to be locked
|
|
* @flags: saved IRQ-flags if the is acquired
|
|
*
|
|
* Same as refcount_dec_and_lock() above except that the spinlock is acquired
|
|
* with disabled interupts.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: true and hold spinlock if able to decrement refcount to 0, false
|
|
* otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
bool refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave(refcount_t *r, spinlock_t *lock,
|
|
unsigned long *flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (refcount_dec_not_one(r))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, *flags);
|
|
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(r)) {
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, *flags);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave);
|