Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit aa8e712cee93d520e96a2ca8e3a20f807c937e3f)
Resolved conflicts around non-backported support for sctp and ib, as
well as missing cgroup and extended socket class policy capabilities.
Change-Id: I73b28fabb29249278ff9d3890f3a98b7baf74731
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:58 +07:00
During random test as own device to check slub account,
we found some slack memory from hashtab_node(kmalloc-64).
By using kzalloc(), middle of test result like below:
allocated size 240768
request size 45144
slack size 195624
allocation count 3762
So, we want to use kmem_cache_zalloc() and that
can reduce memory size 52byte(slack size/alloc count) per each struct.
Signed-off-by: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7c620ece125cbab7b5dfcb574ee1e64ab8b562cd)
Change-Id: I23f426ba037842ffb03287846e484a281230902b
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Kyeongdon Kimauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services,
it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services
and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose
unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services
whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with
running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a
CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=,
SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=,
PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=,
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5)
man page.
The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and
SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these
options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For
users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on
at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep
SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections
because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for
that service provides the same protections in all cases.
commit 7b0d0b40cd ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under
NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in
order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However,
defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains
is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us
to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant
domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain
of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from
descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would
be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking
permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could
weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants
(e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of
its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file,
then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a
symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...).
SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this
manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections
and least privilege.
We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid
mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between
retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on
files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs
in security.
Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to
make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on
a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid)
between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support
for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in
policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of
its children.
With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream.
SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any
of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to
be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the
new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate.
NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential
for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp
filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts
opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from
an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use
with care.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit af63f4193f9fbbbac50fc766417d74735afd87ef)
Resolved conflicts with extended_socket_class and cgroup_seclabel
policy capabilities. These are referred to as "compat1" and "compat2"
in the change to preserve compatibility with the policy binary.
Neither of these policy capabilities are appropriate for backporting
as they will break Treble backwards-compat requirements.
Change-Id: Ib929be4e477e20ce18e1ef23e66cd0ed8d4fe99b
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.
Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux: unknown policy capability 5
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc2fce342f8e5b165e2eda29a39446bb07b2457)
Resolved conflicts with extended_socket_class and cgroup_seclabel
policy capabilities. These are referred to as "compat1" and "compat2"
in the change to preserve compatibility with the policy binary.
Neither of these policy capabilities are appropriate for backporting
as they will break Treble backwards-compat requirements.
Change-Id: Ic1c37514b742829904e3c9536a865f29150658ce
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
This commit causing a page handling failure if the kernel
compiled with LLD, and as the commit message says, this is
just a temporary Android-only patch that will deprecated in
newer kernel, new fix will be backported after it arrives
on upstream (or if Google backported that before I do)
This reverts commit 2c434f622e.
Bug: SELinux Breaks in LLD
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Rapherion Rollerscaperersauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
Some of the changes in this commit are no longer suitable as we
have selinux backports from upstream kernel. Revert it first so
relevant fixes can be ported later.
This reverts commit 90da9cd13d.
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Chenyang Zhongauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit cb8d21e3640f18444c597bddaec156637eacecf8)
Change-Id: Ide6997370b5db4f35fafb84330f7f9bab3e388ad
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Markus Elfringauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2f00e680fe25d8d2758879b772d54cb46a78b59d)
Change-Id: I8bbc5d3698e4eee8c4af4a050c32ce5a2dde7cee
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Markus Elfringauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:57 +07:00
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc().
Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte
for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc().
It can reduce some dynamic allocation size.
Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit b4958c892e02241b9bd121f3397b76225ff6f4a3)
Change-Id: I68b546651051e76907992e18b20fe798aa32eff3
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Junil Leeauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
commit 86c8db86af43f52f682e53a0f2f0828683be1e52 upstream.
We should count the terminating NUL byte as part of the ctx_len.
Otherwise, UBSAN logs a warning:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in security/selinux/xfrm.c:99:14
index 60 is out of range for type 'char [*]'
The allocation itself is correct so there is no actual out of bounds
indexing, just a warning.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ6tA5+LxsGfOJokzdPeRomBHjKLBVR6zbrg+_w3ZZbM3A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
commit 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 upstream.
When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead
of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be
added without interfering with older kernels.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Thiébaud Weksteenauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
commit 42c4e97e06a839b07d834f640a10911ad84ec8b3 upstream.
The Linux Kernel currently only requires make v3.82 while the grouped
target functionality requires make v4.3. Removed the grouped target
introduced in 4ce1f694eb5d ("selinux: ensure av_permissions.h is
built when needed") as well as the multiple header file targets in
the make rule. This effectively reverts the problem commit.
We will revisit this change when make >= 4.3 is required by the rest
of the kernel.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4ce1f694eb5d ("selinux: ensure av_permissions.h is built when needed")
Reported-by: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Reported-by: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap@amazon.com>
Tested-by: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Paul Mooreauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
[ Upstream commit 4ce1f694eb5d8ca607fed8542d32a33b4f1217a5 ]
The Makefile rule responsible for building flask.h and
av_permissions.h only lists flask.h as a target which means that
av_permissions.h is only generated when flask.h needs to be
generated. This patch fixes this by adding av_permissions.h as a
target to the rule.
Fixes: 8753f6bec3 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Paul Mooreauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
[ Upstream commit bcab1adeaad4b39a1e04cb98979a367d08253f03 ]
Make the flask.h target depend on the genheaders binary instead of
classmap.h to ensure that it is rebuilt if any of the dependencies of
genheaders are changed.
Notably this fixes flask.h not being rebuilt when
initial_sid_to_string.h is modified.
Fixes: 8753f6bec3 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli+cip@fpond.eu>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Ondrej Mosnacekauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:56 +07:00
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line and merge tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Antonio Murdacaauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:55 +07:00
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs.
This is required to have separate permissions to allow
access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are
relocating to binderfs.
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Hridya Valsarajuauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:06:55 +07:00
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:02:34 +07:00
SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.
Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit be0554c9bf9f7cc96f5205df8f8bd3573b74320e)
Change-Id: I5436adb11040cdedea245ecfdf6e4fcaf706880f
Bug: 140252993
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 18:02:34 +07:00
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Change-Id: I0c22a92279221b8bc3f83bf259d433eab01044df
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Alexei Starovoitovauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:27 +07:00
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
Change-Id: I7f21bf978186db284d87b61a91061fdd8385b292
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Alexey Budankovauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:27 +07:00
At present, one can write any signed integer value to
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored,
e.g. echo -1 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 >
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference
to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero,
but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux
is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is
already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux
policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered
to be a security issue, but it should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Stephen Smalleyauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:27 +07:00
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Richard Guy Briggsauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:18 +07:00
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Change-Id: Ie70dc489691e2f8413fe593c633a00e6e97bd63a
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Matthew Garrettauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:06 +07:00
This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of
the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down
the size of the struct by about half.
In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the
callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term
purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Sargun Dhillonauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
"struct security_hook_heads" is an array of "struct list_head"
where elements can be initialized just before registration.
There is no need to waste 350+ lines for initialization. Let's
initialize "struct security_hook_heads" just before registration.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Tetsuo Handaauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
The commit d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend
security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name,
which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available
to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its
hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with
all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the
source code easier to review and maintain.
This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while
keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in
Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which
checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If
an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM
registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in
the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times.
To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with
"capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will
remain as is.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Mickaël Salaünauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Casey Schauflerauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f8f51085b4be6132762ce0d8940071ccdcce2504)
[vegard: fix conflict due to missing commit
df0ce17331e2501dbffc060041dfc6c5f85227b5 ("security: convert security
hooks to use hlist")]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Alfred Piccioniauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
(cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e)
[ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older codebase, and folded in upstream
ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and
failures). ]
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I68ee3dba85c8d64e24f28a0fbc8db2aed3b6f77b
Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rapherion Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenyang Zhong <zhongcy95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Joel Fernandes (Google)authored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:05 +07:00
Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about
25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out.
Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to
use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were
disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create,
timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete,
clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm.
The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast
majority of use cases with very little code.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Nicolas Pitreauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:59:01 +07:00
Buildable skeleton of AF_XDP without any functionality. Just what it
takes to register a new address family.
Change-Id: I2116ce900e3ac94ab7329ec9578a3f8eff9d750d
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Björn Töpelauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:57:46 +07:00
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Change-Id: Ic7cca08bbba3c38e0d53d3374c43ee8bf1e24172
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Thomas Gleixnerauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:57:45 +07:00
move COUNT_ARGS() macro from apparmor to generic header and extend it
to count till twelve.
COUNT() was an alternative name for this logic, but it's used for
different purpose in many other places.
Similarly for CONCATENATE() macro.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: Ibeebdc6504ee1cbe5a71f6781e2019a06816a92c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Alexei Starovoitovauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:55:41 +07:00
This is non-functional change to prepare the device cgroup code
for adding eBPF-based controller for cgroups v2.
The patch performs the following changes:
1) __devcgroup_inode_permission() and devcgroup_inode_mknod()
are moving to the device-cgroup.h and converting into static inline.
2) __devcgroup_check_permission() is exported.
3) devcgroup_check_permission() wrapper is introduced to be used
by both existing and new bpf-based implementations.
Change-Id: Id3999e8ed5773ad97c0907220664d2f2cbde8294
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Roman Gushchinauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:55:40 +07:00
Rename device type and access type constants defined in
security/device_cgroup.c by adding the DEVCG_ prefix.
The reason behind this renaming is to make them global namespace
friendly, as they will be moved to the corresponding header file
by following patches.
Change-Id: Ic3ebf0bd65e25e4284bc06bb7ce4ab79fa28c634
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Roman Gushchinauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:55:40 +07:00
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Eric Biggersauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:55:17 +07:00
This is a backport from Linux 5.2-rc1 of a patch series to greatly enhance vmalloc's performance
especially on embedded systems, plus all of its dependencies that were missing in kernel 4.9.
For all the informations, refer to LKML: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/19/786
Brief informations:
Currently an allocation of the new VA area is done over busy list iteration until a suitable hole
is found between two busy areas. Therefore each new allocation causes the list being grown.
Due to long list and different permissive parameters an allocation can take a long time on
embedded devices(milliseconds).
This patch organizes the vmalloc memory layout into free areas of the VMALLOC_START-VMALLOC_END range.
It uses a red-black tree that keeps blocks sorted by their offsets in pair with linked list
keeping the free space in order of increasing addresses.
Quote Phoronix:
With this patch from Uladzislau Rezki, calling vmalloc() can take up to 67% less time compared
to the behavior on Linux 5.1 and prior, at least with tests done by the developer under QEMU.
Personal tests are showing that the device is more responsive when memory pressure is
high and when huge allocations are to be done, it's also noticeably faster in this case, like
when starting Chrome with more than 100 opened tabs after a system reboot (so, an
uncached complete load of it).
Shameless kanged from:
https://github.com/sonyxperiadev/kernel / Pull Request 2016
Signed-off-by: sweetyicecare <gabrielseedev@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Aoihara <veronicadisa6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KangMamles <imzea69@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Angelo G. Del Regnoauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:48:25 +07:00
Audit is bad. It affects performance under all circumstances. It's also
dirty.
From LWN: "Andy submitted a patch to fix this particular problem, but he
didn't stop there. He has come to the conclusion that the audit
subsystem is beyond repair, so his patch marks the whole thing as being
broken, making it generally inaccessible. He cited a number of problems
beyond this security issue: it hurts performance even when it is not
being used, it is not (in his mind) reliable, it has problems with
various architectures, and "its approach to freeing memory is
terrifying." All told, Andy said, we're better off without it"
Signed-off-by: kdrag0n <dragon@khronodragon.com>
Signed-off-by: Park Ju Hyung <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Raphiel Rollerscaperers <rapherion@raphielgang.org>
Signed-off-by: DennySPB <dennyspb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: prorooter007 <shreyashwasnik112@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
kdrag0nauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:48:20 +07:00
Auditing comes with a lot of overhead due to string assembly via
vsnprintf. It isn't actually needed to make SELinux work, so remove
SELinux's artificial dependency on it to make it possible to use SELinux
without the unneeded overhead.
Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
Sultan Alsawafauthored and Sorayukiicommited 2026-05-15 17:48:20 +07:00
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Merge 4.9.337 into android-4.9-q
Changes in 4.9.337
mm/khugepaged: fix GUP-fast interaction by sending IPI
mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths
block: unhash blkdev part inode when the part is deleted
ASoC: ops: Check bounds for second channel in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx()
can: sja1000: fix size of OCR_MODE_MASK define
ASoC: ops: Correct bounds check for second channel on SX controls
udf: Discard preallocation before extending file with a hole
udf: Drop unused arguments of udf_delete_aext()
udf: Fix preallocation discarding at indirect extent boundary
udf: Do not bother looking for prealloc extents if i_lenExtents matches i_size
udf: Fix extending file within last block
usb: gadget: uvc: Prevent buffer overflow in setup handler
USB: serial: cp210x: add Kamstrup RF sniffer PIDs
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix u8 overflow
net: loopback: use NET_NAME_PREDICTABLE for name_assign_type
drivers: soc: ti: knav_qmss_queue: Mark knav_acc_firmwares as static
arm: dts: spear600: Fix clcd interrupt
soc: ti: smartreflex: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in omap_sr_probe
ARM: dts: dove: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: dts: armada-370: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: dts: armada-xp: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: dts: armada-375: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: dts: armada-38x: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: dts: armada-39x: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
ARM: mmp: fix timer_read delay
pstore: Avoid kcore oops by vmap()ing with VM_IOREMAP
cpuidle: dt: Return the correct numbers of parsed idle states
alpha: fix syscall entry in !AUDUT_SYSCALL case
PM: hibernate: Fix mistake in kerneldoc comment
fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()
perf: Fix possible memleak in pmu_dev_alloc()
timerqueue: Use rb_entry_safe() in timerqueue_getnext()
ocfs2: fix memory leak in ocfs2_stack_glue_init()
MIPS: vpe-mt: fix possible memory leak while module exiting
MIPS: vpe-cmp: fix possible memory leak while module exiting
PNP: fix name memory leak in pnp_alloc_dev()
irqchip: gic-pm: Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get() in gic_probe()
libfs: add DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for signed value
lib/notifier-error-inject: fix error when writing -errno to debugfs file
rapidio: fix possible name leaks when rio_add_device() fails
rapidio: rio: fix possible name leak in rio_register_mport()
ACPICA: Fix use-after-free in acpi_ut_copy_ipackage_to_ipackage()
uprobes/x86: Allow to probe a NOP instruction with 0x66 prefix
x86/xen: Fix memory leak in xen_init_lock_cpu()
MIPS: BCM63xx: Add check for NULL for clk in clk_enable
fs: sysv: Fix sysv_nblocks() returns wrong value
rapidio: fix possible UAF when kfifo_alloc() fails
eventfd: change int to __u64 in eventfd_signal() ifndef CONFIG_EVENTFD
hfs: Fix OOB Write in hfs_asc2mac
rapidio: devices: fix missing put_device in mport_cdev_open
wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: fix memory leak of urbs in ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_tx_urbs()
wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: Fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb()
media: i2c: ad5820: Fix error path
media: vivid: fix compose size exceed boundary
mtd: Fix device name leak when register device failed in add_mtd_device()
ASoC: pxa: fix null-pointer dereference in filter()
regulator: core: fix unbalanced of node refcount in regulator_dev_lookup()
ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
wifi: ath10k: Fix return value in ath10k_pci_init()
mtd: lpddr2_nvm: Fix possible null-ptr-deref
Input: elants_i2c - properly handle the reset GPIO when power is off
media: solo6x10: fix possible memory leak in solo_sysfs_init()
media: platform: exynos4-is: Fix error handling in fimc_md_init()
HID: hid-sensor-custom: set fixed size for custom attributes
ALSA: seq: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_USE_EVENT
clk: rockchip: Fix memory leak in rockchip_clk_register_pll()
mtd: maps: pxa2xx-flash: fix memory leak in probe
media: imon: fix a race condition in send_packet()
pinctrl: pinconf-generic: add missing of_node_put()
media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()
NFSv4.2: Fix a memory stomp in decode_attr_security_label
NFSv4: Fix a deadlock between nfs4_open_recover_helper() and delegreturn
ALSA: asihpi: fix missing pci_disable_device()
drm/radeon: Fix PCI device refcount leak in radeon_atrm_get_bios()
drm/amdgpu: Fix PCI device refcount leak in amdgpu_atrm_get_bios()
ASoC: pcm512x: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in pcm512x_probe
bonding: uninitialized variable in bond_miimon_inspect()
regulator: core: fix module refcount leak in set_supply()
media: saa7164: fix missing pci_disable_device()
ALSA: mts64: fix possible null-ptr-defer in snd_mts64_interrupt
SUNRPC: Fix missing release socket in rpc_sockname()
mmc: moxart: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: mxcmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: rtsx_usb_sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: toshsd: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: vub300: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: via-sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: wbsd: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc: mmci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
media: c8sectpfe: Add of_node_put() when breaking out of loop
media: coda: Add check for dcoda_iram_alloc
media: coda: Add check for kmalloc
wifi: rtl8xxxu: Add __packed to struct rtl8723bu_c2h
wifi: brcmfmac: Fix error return code in brcmf_sdio_download_firmware()
blktrace: Fix output non-blktrace event when blk_classic option enabled
net: vmw_vsock: vmci: Check memcpy_from_msg()
net: defxx: Fix missing err handling in dfx_init()
drivers: net: qlcnic: Fix potential memory leak in qlcnic_sriov_init()
ethernet: s2io: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
net: farsync: Fix kmemleak when rmmods farsync
net/tunnel: wait until all sk_user_data reader finish before releasing the sock
net: apple: mace: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
net: apple: bmac: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
net: emaclite: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
net: ethernet: dnet: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
hamradio: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
net: amd: lance: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
ntb_netdev: Use dev_kfree_skb_any() in interrupt context
Bluetooth: btusb: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
Bluetooth: hci_qca: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
Bluetooth: hci_h5: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
Bluetooth: hci_bcsp: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
Bluetooth: hci_core: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
stmmac: fix potential division by 0
scsi: hpsa: Fix error handling in hpsa_add_sas_host()
scsi: hpsa: Fix possible memory leak in hpsa_add_sas_device()
scsi: fcoe: Fix possible name leak when device_register() fails
scsi: ipr: Fix WARNING in ipr_init()
scsi: fcoe: Fix transport not deattached when fcoe_if_init() fails
scsi: snic: Fix possible UAF in snic_tgt_create()
orangefs: Fix sysfs not cleanup when dev init failed
crypto: img-hash - Fix variable dereferenced before check 'hdev->req'
hwrng: amd - Fix PCI device refcount leak
hwrng: geode - Fix PCI device refcount leak
IB/IPoIB: Fix queue count inconsistency for PKEY child interfaces
drivers: dio: fix possible memory leak in dio_init()
vfio: platform: Do not pass return buffer to ACPI _RST method
uio: uio_dmem_genirq: Fix missing unlock in irq configuration
uio: uio_dmem_genirq: Fix deadlock between irq config and handling
usb: fotg210-udc: Fix ages old endianness issues
staging: vme_user: Fix possible UAF in tsi148_dma_list_add
serial: amba-pl011: avoid SBSA UART accessing DMACR register
serial: pch: Fix PCI device refcount leak in pch_request_dma()
serial: sunsab: Fix error handling in sunsab_init()
misc: tifm: fix possible memory leak in tifm_7xx1_switch_media()
misc: sgi-gru: fix use-after-free error in gru_set_context_option, gru_fault and gru_handle_user_call_os
cxl: fix possible null-ptr-deref in cxl_guest_init_afu|adapter()
cxl: fix possible null-ptr-deref in cxl_pci_init_afu|adapter()
drivers: mcb: fix resource leak in mcb_probe()
mcb: mcb-parse: fix error handing in chameleon_parse_gdd()
chardev: fix error handling in cdev_device_add()
i2c: pxa-pci: fix missing pci_disable_device() on error in ce4100_i2c_probe
staging: rtl8192u: Fix use after free in ieee80211_rx()
staging: rtl8192e: Fix potential use-after-free in rtllib_rx_Monitor()
vme: Fix error not catched in fake_init()
i2c: ismt: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in ismt_access()
usb: storage: Add check for kcalloc
fbdev: ssd1307fb: Drop optional dependency
fbdev: pm2fb: fix missing pci_disable_device()
fbdev: via: Fix error in via_core_init()
fbdev: vermilion: decrease reference count in error path
fbdev: uvesafb: Fixes an error handling path in uvesafb_probe()
HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix unbalanced pm_runtime_disable()
HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix possible memory leak in ssi_probe()
power: supply: fix residue sysfs file in error handle route of __power_supply_register()
HSI: omap_ssi_core: Fix error handling in ssi_init()
include/uapi/linux/swab: Fix potentially missing __always_inline
rtc: snvs: Allow a time difference on clock register read
iommu/fsl_pamu: Fix resource leak in fsl_pamu_probe()
macintosh: fix possible memory leak in macio_add_one_device()
macintosh/macio-adb: check the return value of ioremap()
powerpc/52xx: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path
powerpc/perf: callchain validate kernel stack pointer bounds
powerpc/83xx/mpc832x_rdb: call platform_device_put() in error case in of_fsl_spi_probe()
powerpc/hv-gpci: Fix hv_gpci event list
selftests/powerpc: Fix resource leaks
rtc: st-lpc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in st_rtc_probe()
nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure
mISDN: hfcsusb: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
mISDN: hfcpci: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
mISDN: hfcmulti: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
r6040: Fix kmemleak in probe and remove
openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key
skbuff: Account for tail adjustment during pull operations
net_sched: reject TCF_EM_SIMPLE case for complex ematch module
myri10ge: Fix an error handling path in myri10ge_probe()
net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()
binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flags
fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG
udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename()
fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG
ACPICA: Fix error code path in acpi_ds_call_control_method()
nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds/overflow in nilfs_sb2_bad_offset()
acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()
hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present
wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out
ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver
net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()
hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()
wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()
igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated
s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()
s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()
s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()
drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()
md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed
mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit
ppp: associate skb with a device at tx
media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw
media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()
blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register 'hctx' failed
mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability
media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()
clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()
drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()
ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()
ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock
ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()
ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()
HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode
reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock
gcov: add support for checksum field
powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()
HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk
hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount
ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt
ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit
pnode: terminate at peers of source
md: fix a crash in mempool_free
mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING
media: stv0288: use explicitly signed char
ktest.pl minconfig: Unset configs instead of just removing them
ARM: ux500: do not directly dereference __iomem
dm cache: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_cache_metadata_abort
dm thin: Use last transaction's pmd->root when commit failed
dm thin: Fix UAF in run_timer_softirq()
dm cache: Fix UAF in destroy()
dm cache: set needs_check flag after aborting metadata
tracing: Fix infinite loop in tracing_read_pipe on overflowed print_trace_line
ARM: 9256/1: NWFPE: avoid compiler-generated __aeabi_uldivmod
media: dvb-core: Fix double free in dvb_register_device()
cifs: fix confusing debug message
PCI/sysfs: Fix double free in error path
crypto: n2 - add missing hash statesize
iommu/amd: Fix ivrs_acpihid cmdline parsing code
parisc: led: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in start_task()
device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
drm/connector: send hotplug uevent on connector cleanup
drm/vmwgfx: Validate the box size for the snooped cursor
ext4: add inode table check in __ext4_get_inode_loc to aovid possible infinite loop
ext4: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for ext4_check_flag_values
ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search caused by bad boot loader inode
ext4: init quota for 'old.inode' in 'ext4_rename'
ext4: fix error code return to user-space in ext4_get_branch()
ext4: avoid BUG_ON when creating xattrs
ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl
Linux 4.9.337
Change-Id: I923e3fef499ae1688b25c70a1a805b55a9f4f027
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
commit e68bfbd3b3c3a0ec3cf8c230996ad8cabe90322f upstream.
When add the 'a *:* rwm' entry to devcgroup A's whitelist, at first A's
exceptions will be cleaned and A's behavior is changed to
DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW. Then parent's exceptions will be copyed to A's
whitelist. If copy failure occurs, just return leaving A to grant
permissions to all devices. And A may grant more permissions than
parent.
Backup A's whitelist and recover original exceptions after copy
failure.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4cef7299b4 ("device_cgroup: add proper checking when changing default behavior")
Signed-off-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wang Weiyangauthored and Greg Kroah-Hartmancommited 2023-01-07 12:07:37 +01:00
[ Upstream commit 25369175ce84813dd99d6604e710dc2491f68523 ]
The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so
when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be
sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field).
Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's
better to make it logically right.
Fixes: adf53a778a ("ima: new templates management mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Xiu Jianfengauthored and Greg Kroah-Hartmancommited 2023-01-07 12:07:16 +01:00
When using loopback device with dio, we can't rely on page flag.
Bug: 141601405
Bug: 141860559
Bug: 140882488
Change-Id: I09526c25e8d5333853e777f29333f9fa8da37459
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
Jaegeuk Kimauthored and Michael Bestascommited 2022-11-30 02:21:44 +02:00
This reverts commit c58c561f99.
That out of tree patch causes the resulting kernel image to be too
large, causing ld.lld to error; since .bss is specified twice.
Fixes the observed error:
ld.lld: error: output file too large: 18446743524330100280 bytes
when using LLD without LTO enabled.
Bug: 151154720
Reported-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Debugged-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib3a0a86d7d863e8e10d23359b19462d46f127dff
Nick Desaulniersauthored and Michael Bestascommited 2022-10-13 01:53:44 +03:00
This reverts commit 50ced54e5b.
That out of tree patch causes the resulting kernel image to be too
large, causing ld.lld to error; since .bss is specified twice.
Fixes the observed error:
ld.lld: error: output file too large: 18446743524330100280 bytes
when using LLD without LTO enabled.
Bug: 151154720
Reported-by: Matthias Maennich <maennich@google.com>
Debugged-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Change-Id: Iebb8135630132cd4ae49f3d2d1e85bd61cfa6111
Nick Desaulniersauthored and Michael Bestascommited 2022-10-13 01:53:44 +03:00
Stephen Smalley
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Sorayukii
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Chenyang Zhong
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authored and
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authored and
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authored and
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authored and
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authored and
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Tetsuo Handa
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