Commit graph android_kernel_sony_sdm845/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
Message SHA1
ANDROID: overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials.  The incoming accesses are
checked against the caller's credentials.

If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's
credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when
accessing the overlayfs filesystem.  For example, a file that a lower
DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally
higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.

We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
caller's credentials.  The module boolean parameter and mount option
override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.

It was not always this way.  Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's
credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories
were temporarily increased to perform the operations.  The MAC
(selinux) policies were caller's in all cases.  override_creds=off
partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure
temporary credential increases.  This is to permit use in a system
with non-overlapping security models for each executable including
the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem.  In Android
this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations,
has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface,
and services that use the content have a different set of MAC
privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for
vendor libraries and modules).  The caveats are not a problem in
the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for
completeness and for general use in time.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
---
v9:
- Add to the caveats

v8:
- drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it.
- added a use case in the commit message

v7:
- change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def
- report override_creds only if different than default

v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.

v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
  "overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh"
  "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off

v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text

v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the
  boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS

v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
(cherry picked from https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1009299)
Bug: 109821005
Bug: 112955896
Bug: 127298877
Change-Id: I1d99298ec5e71174734481be3497763c6b9d42e1

Mark Salyzyn   commited 2019-03-05 21:50:18 +00:00
f5f87ecac1
Build break
Revert "FROMLIST: BACKPORT: overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred"

This reverts commit 3bc419d8de.

Reason for revert: <INSERT REASONING HERE>

Change-Id: I44312d18aeb84ace19f7d27ec3bcb219183d95fa

Mark Salyzyn   commited 2019-02-22 20:40:05 +00:00
f5f03ad347
FROMLIST: BACKPORT: overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials.  The incoming accesses are
checked against the caller's credentials.

If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's
credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when
accessing the overlayfs filesystem.  For example, a file that a lower
DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally
higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.

We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
caller's credentials.  The module boolean parameter and mount option
override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.

It was not always this way.  Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's
credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories
were temporarily increased to perform the operations.  The MAC
(selinux) policies were caller's in all cases.  override_creds=off
partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure
temporary credential increases.  This is to permit use in a system
with non-overlapping security models for each executable including
the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem.  In Android
this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations,
has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface,
and services that use the content have a different set of MAC
privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for
vendor libraries and modules).  The caveats are not a problem in
the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for
completeness and for general use in time.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
---
v9:
- Add to the caveats

v8:
- drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it.
- added a use case in the commit message

v7:
- change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def
- report override_creds only if different than default

v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.

v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
  "overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh"
  "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off

v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text

v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the
  boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS

v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
(cherry picked from https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1009299)
Bug: 109821005
Bug: 112955896
Change-Id: Ie43b0c7dfd64f4cfc27dfe5e1622ea01f3b000cf

Mark Salyzyn   commited 2019-02-21 12:45:59 -08:00
3bc419d8de
ovl: update doc
Some of the documented quirks no longer apply.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2016-09-01 11:12:00 +02:00
026e5e0cc1
ovl: update documentation
Two "fixme" items are actually fixed now.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2016-05-27 08:55:26 +02:00
942fd803e6
Remove email address from Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
I'm getting a surprising large number of questions about overlayfs sent
to me personally, rather than to a relevant mailing list.

So remove my email address from the documentation, and add a note
about looking in the MAINTAINERS file.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

NeilBrown   authored and   Jonathan Corbet   commited 2015-11-11 10:04:53 -07:00
a907c90765
ovl: document lower layer ordering
Reported-by: Fabian Sturm <fabian.sturm@aduu.de> 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2015-01-08 15:09:15 +01:00
6d900f5a33
ovl: add testsuite to docs
Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2014-12-13 00:59:53 +01:00
2b7a8f36f0
ovl: support multiple lower layers
Allow "lowerdir=" option to contain multiple lower directories separated by
a colon (e.g. "lowerdir=/bin:/usr/bin").  Colon characters in filenames can
be escaped with a backslash.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2014-12-13 00:59:52 +01:00
a78d9f0d5d
ovl: rename filesystem type to "overlay"
Some distributions carry an "old" format of overlayfs while mainline has a
"new" format.

The distros will possibly want to keep the old overlayfs alongside the new
for compatibility reasons.

To make it possible to differentiate the two versions change the name of
the new one from "overlayfs" to "overlay".

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

Miklos Szeredi   commited 2014-11-20 16:39:59 +01:00
ef94b1864d
overlay: overlay filesystem documentation
Document the overlay filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Neil Brown   authored and   Miklos Szeredi   commited 2014-10-24 00:14:39 +02:00
7c37fbda85