diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 6934d28edb9d..969014e57bdd 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = -ESRCH; if (!task) goto out_no_task; + + /* A task may only write its own attributes. */ + length = -EACCES; + if (current != task) + goto out; + if (count > PAGE_SIZE) count = PAGE_SIZE; @@ -2748,14 +2754,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, } /* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */ - length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + length = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); if (length < 0) goto out_free; - length = security_setprocattr(task, - (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, + length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: kfree(page); out: diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index baee9e209f13..2173cc866a2c 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1589,8 +1589,7 @@ union security_list_options { void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); - int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, - size_t size); + int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name); int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c67d1528cdbd..381fee73cfaa 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter); void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); -int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); +int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); @@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char * return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) +static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 1053a5e5975a..2bdd48698980 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -498,8 +498,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, return error; } -static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, - void *value, size_t size) +static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, + size_t size) { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; @@ -509,9 +509,6 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, if (size == 0) return -EINVAL; - /* task can only write its own attributes */ - if (current != task) - return -EACCES; /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d46a3b8800d1..90a98b89f6e6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1265,9 +1265,9 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value); } -int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) +int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { - return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size); + return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size); } int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9473d5f584c4..994a7a87cb9b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5857,8 +5857,7 @@ bad: return error; } -static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, - char *name, void *value, size_t size) +static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; @@ -5866,16 +5865,6 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int error; char *str = value; - if (current != p) { - /* - * A task may only alter its own credentials. - * SELinux has always enforced this restriction, - * and it is now mandated by the Linux credentials - * infrastructure; see Documentation/security/credentials.txt. - */ - return -EACCES; - } - /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d0700675c2d0..01564d121816 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3599,7 +3599,6 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) /** * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting - * @p: the object task * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr * @value: the value to set * @size: the size of the value @@ -3609,8 +3608,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) * * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code */ -static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, - void *value, size_t size) +static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); struct cred *new; @@ -3618,13 +3616,6 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; int rc; - /* - * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous - * and supports no sane use case. - */ - if (p != current) - return -EPERM; - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) return -EPERM;