This is the 4.9.78 stable release

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Merge 4.9.78 into android-4.9-o

Changes in 4.9.78
	libnvdimm, btt: Fix an incompatibility in the log layout
	scsi: sg: disable SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA
	futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
	ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free
	ALSA: pcm: Remove yet superfluous WARN_ON()
	ALSA: hda - Apply headphone noise quirk for another Dell XPS 13 variant
	ALSA: hda - Apply the existing quirk to iMac 14,1
	timers: Unconditionally check deferrable base
	af_key: fix buffer overread in verify_address_len()
	af_key: fix buffer overread in parse_exthdrs()
	iser-target: Fix possible use-after-free in connection establishment error
	scsi: hpsa: fix volume offline state
	sched/deadline: Zero out positive runtime after throttling constrained tasks
	x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs
	x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros
	objtool: Improve error message for bad file argument
	x86/cpufeature: Move processor tracing out of scattered features
	module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC
	x86/mm/pkeys: Fix fill_sig_info_pkey
	x86/tsc: Fix erroneous TSC rate on Skylake Xeon
	pipe: avoid round_pipe_size() nr_pages overflow on 32-bit
	x86/apic/vector: Fix off by one in error path
	perf tools: Fix build with ARCH=x86_64
	Input: ALPS - fix multi-touch decoding on SS4 plus touchpads
	Input: 88pm860x-ts - fix child-node lookup
	Input: twl6040-vibra - fix child-node lookup
	Input: twl4030-vibra - fix sibling-node lookup
	tracing: Fix converting enum's from the map in trace_event_eval_update()
	phy: work around 'phys' references to usb-nop-xceiv devices
	ARM: sunxi_defconfig: Enable CMA
	ARM: dts: kirkwood: fix pin-muxing of MPP7 on OpenBlocks A7
	can: peak: fix potential bug in packet fragmentation
	scripts/gdb/linux/tasks.py: fix get_thread_info
	proc: fix coredump vs read /proc/*/stat race
	libata: apply MAX_SEC_1024 to all LITEON EP1 series devices
	workqueue: avoid hard lockups in show_workqueue_state()
	dm btree: fix serious bug in btree_split_beneath()
	dm thin metadata: THIN_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS should be 6
	arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls
	x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
	usbip: fix warning in vhci_hcd_probe/lockdep_init_map
	x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
	retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
	kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
	kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
	x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
	x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
	MIPS: AR7: ensure the port type's FCR value is used
	Linux 4.9.78

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-23 20:33:12 +01:00
commit bf3b33980d
60 changed files with 525 additions and 167 deletions

View file

@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ this protection comes at a cost:
non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
things into the userspace page tables. The downside is
that stacks must be switched at entry time.
d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
c. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables. This
feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
entries mapping the kernel. Losing the feature means more

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
SUBLEVEL = 77
SUBLEVEL = 78
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus

View file

@ -53,7 +53,8 @@
};
pinctrl: pin-controller@10000 {
pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header>;
pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header
&pmx_gpio_header_gpo>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pmx_uart0: pmx-uart0 {
@ -85,11 +86,16 @@
* ground.
*/
pmx_gpio_header: pmx-gpio-header {
marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp7", "mpp29", "mpp28",
marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp29", "mpp28",
"mpp35", "mpp34", "mpp40";
marvell,function = "gpio";
};
pmx_gpio_header_gpo: pxm-gpio-header-gpo {
marvell,pins = "mpp7";
marvell,function = "gpo";
};
pmx_gpio_init: pmx-init {
marvell,pins = "mpp38";
marvell,function = "gpio";

View file

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y
CONFIG_NR_CPUS=8
CONFIG_AEABI=y
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y
CONFIG_CMA=y
CONFIG_ARM_APPENDED_DTB=y
CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ=y
@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ CONFIG_CAN_SUN4I=y
# CONFIG_WIRELESS is not set
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y
CONFIG_ATA=y
CONFIG_AHCI_SUNXI=y

View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
ret = kvm_psci_call(vcpu);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int handle_hvc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
static int handle_smc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, 0, ~0UL);
return 1;
}

View file

@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int __init ar7_register_uarts(void)
uart_port.type = PORT_AR7;
uart_port.uartclk = clk_get_rate(bus_clk) / 2;
uart_port.iotype = UPIO_MEM32;
uart_port.flags = UPF_FIXED_TYPE;
uart_port.flags = UPF_FIXED_TYPE | UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF;
uart_port.regshift = 2;
uart_port.line = 0;

View file

@ -229,6 +229,17 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
* with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popl %esi
popl %edi

View file

@ -427,6 +427,17 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union)+stack_canary_offset
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
* with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popq %r15
popq %r14
@ -1053,7 +1064,7 @@ idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault has_error_code=1
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
idtentry machine_check has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 do_sym=*machine_check_vector(%rip)
idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
/*

View file

@ -197,9 +197,9 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
@ -235,6 +235,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP ( 9*32+20) /* Supervisor Mode Access Prevention */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT ( 9*32+23) /* CLFLUSHOPT instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLWB ( 9*32+24) /* CLWB instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 9*32+25) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF ( 9*32+26) /* AVX-512 Prefetch */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER ( 9*32+27) /* AVX-512 Exponential and Reciprocal */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD ( 9*32+28) /* AVX-512 Conflict Detection */

View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
*
* Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
* infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
* infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
*
* This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
* mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
@ -38,11 +38,13 @@
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
dec reg; \
@ -73,6 +75,7 @@
call .Ldo_rop_\@
.Lspec_trap_\@:
pause
lfence
jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
.Ldo_rop_\@:
mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
@ -165,6 +168,7 @@
" .align 16\n" \
"901: call 903f;\n" \
"902: pause;\n" \
" lfence;\n" \
" jmp 902b;\n" \
" .align 16\n" \
"903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
@ -190,6 +194,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
/*
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
@ -199,16 +206,17 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
unsigned long loops;
asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
"910:"
: "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "r" (loops) : "memory" );
: "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: : "memory" );
#endif
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */

View file

@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
dotraplinkage void do_iret_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *, long);
static inline int get_si_code(unsigned long condition)
{

View file

@ -361,14 +361,17 @@ static int x86_vector_alloc_irqs(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq,
irq_data->chip_data = data;
irq_data->hwirq = virq + i;
err = assign_irq_vector_policy(virq + i, node, data, info);
if (err)
if (err) {
irq_data->chip_data = NULL;
free_apic_chip_data(data);
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
x86_vector_free_irqs(domain, virq, i + 1);
x86_vector_free_irqs(domain, virq, i);
return err;
}

View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
@ -154,6 +155,23 @@ disable:
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
}
/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@ -212,6 +230,24 @@ retpoline_auto:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
* If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
*
* Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
* RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
* The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
* or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
* switch is required.
*/
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
}
#undef pr_fmt

View file

@ -883,8 +883,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);

View file

@ -1754,6 +1754,11 @@ static void unexpected_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *, long error_code) =
unexpected_machine_check;
dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
machine_check_vector(regs, error_code);
}
/*
* Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
* Must be called with preempt off:

View file

@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
const struct cpuid_bit *cb;
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, CR_EBX,25, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CR_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CR_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },

View file

@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "common.h"
@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ static int copy_optimized_instructions(u8 *dest, u8 *src)
}
/* Check whether insn is indirect jump */
static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
static int __insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
{
return ((insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0xff &&
(X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.value) & 6) == 4) || /* Jump */
@ -226,6 +227,26 @@ static int insn_jump_into_range(struct insn *insn, unsigned long start, int len)
return (start <= target && target <= start + len);
}
static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
{
int ret = __insn_is_indirect_jump(insn);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* Jump to x86_indirect_thunk_* is treated as an indirect jump.
* Note that even with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, the kernel compiled with
* older gcc may use indirect jump. So we add this check instead of
* replace indirect-jump check.
*/
if (!ret)
ret = insn_jump_into_range(insn,
(unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start,
(unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_end -
(unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start);
#endif
return ret;
}
/* Decode whole function to ensure any instructions don't jump into target */
static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
{

View file

@ -693,7 +693,6 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
crystal_khz = 24000; /* 24.0 MHz */
break;
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON:
crystal_khz = 25000; /* 25.0 MHz */
break;

View file

@ -105,6 +105,13 @@ SECTIONS
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
*(.fixup)
*(.gnu.warning)
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
__indirect_thunk_start = .;
*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
__indirect_thunk_end = .;
#endif
/* End of text section */
_etext = .;
} :text = 0x9090

View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.macro THUNK reg
.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg
.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
CFI_STARTPROC
@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
* than one per register with the correct names. So we do it
* the simple and nasty way...
*/
#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
#define __EXPORT_THUNK(sym) _ASM_NOKPROBE(sym); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sym)
#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX)

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