Merge android-4.9.120 (f85543b) into msm-4.9
* refs/heads/tmp-f85543b: Linux 4.9.120 x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present x86/cpu/amd: Limit cpu_core_id fixup to families older than F17h x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures x86/init: fix build with CONFIG_SWAP=n cpu/hotplug: Non-SMP machines do not make use of booted_once x86/smp: fix non-SMP broken build due to redefinition of apic_id_is_primary_thread x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled x86/microcode: Do not upload microcode if CPUs are offline tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability KVM: VMX: support MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES as a feature MSR KVM: X86: Allow userspace to define the microcode version KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_get_msr_feature() KVM: SVM: Add MSR-based feature support for serializing LFENCE KVM: x86: Add a framework for supporting MSR-based features Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond' x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages' content Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers kvm: nVMX: Update MSR load counts on a VMCS switch x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support. x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry mm: x86: move _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY from bit 7 to bit 1 x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge IB/ocrdma: fix out of bounds access to local buffer mtd: nand: qcom: Add a NULL check for devm_kasprintf() IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable IB/core: Make testing MR flags for writability a static inline function proc: Fix proc_sys_prune_dcache to hold a sb reference proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock. proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race fix mntput/mntput race make sure that __dentry_kill() always invalidates d_seq, unhashed or not root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing init: rename and re-order boot_cpu_state_init() scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled ACPI / LPSS: Add missing prv_offset setting for byt/cht PWM devices xen/netfront: don't cache skb_shinfo() Mark HI and TASKLET softirq synchronous kasan: add no_sanitize attribute for clang builds parisc: Define mb() and add memory barriers to assembler unlock sequences parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default tpm: fix race condition in tpm_common_write() ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes ANDROID: AVB error handler to invalidate vbmeta partition. Conflicts: include/linux/swapfile.h kernel/smp.c kernel/softirq.c Change-Id: Ied9792f455e336bf7e3bdcf9a6c21f7a212b6db6 Signed-off-by: Blagovest Kolenichev <bkolenichev@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Minming Qi <mqi@codeaurora.org>
This commit is contained in:
Minming Qi
commit
a3ab5da4eb
108 changed files with 2951 additions and 382 deletions
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@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
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Date: January 2018
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Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
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@ -367,3 +368,26 @@ Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
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"Not affected" CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
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"Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
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"Mitigation: $M" CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
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Details about the l1tf file can be found in
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Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
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What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
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Date: June 2018
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Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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Description: Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
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active: Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
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control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
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values:
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"on" SMT is enabled
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"off" SMT is disabled
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"forceoff" SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
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"notsupported" SMT is not supported by the CPU
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If control status is "forceoff" or "notsupported" writes
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are rejected.
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|
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Contents:
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:maxdepth: 2
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kernel-documentation
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l1tf
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development-process/index
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dev-tools/tools
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driver-api/index
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|
|
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@ -2032,10 +2032,84 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
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(virtualized real and unpaged mode) on capable
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Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled)
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kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=[KVM,Intel] Mitigation for L1 Terminal Fault
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CVE-2018-3620.
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Valid arguments: never, cond, always
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always: L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
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cond: Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between
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VMEXIT and VMENTER can leak host memory.
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never: Disables the mitigation
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Default is cond (do L1 cache flush in specific instances)
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kvm-intel.vpid= [KVM,Intel] Disable Virtual Processor Identification
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feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
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Default is 1 (enabled)
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l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
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affected CPUs
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The kernel PTE inversion protection is unconditionally
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enabled and cannot be disabled.
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full
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Provides all available mitigations for the
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L1TF vulnerability. Disables SMT and
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enables all mitigations in the
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hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flush.
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the
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sysfs interface is still possible after
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boot. Hypervisors will issue a warning
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when the first VM is started in a
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potentially insecure configuration,
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i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
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full,force
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Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D
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flush runtime control. Implies the
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'nosmt=force' command line option.
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(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
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flush
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Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default
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hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
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L1D flush.
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|
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the
|
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sysfs interface is still possible after
|
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boot. Hypervisors will issue a warning
|
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when the first VM is started in a
|
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potentially insecure configuration,
|
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i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
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flush,nosmt
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Disables SMT and enables the default
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hypervisor mitigation.
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|
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the
|
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sysfs interface is still possible after
|
||||
boot. Hypervisors will issue a warning
|
||||
when the first VM is started in a
|
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potentially insecure configuration,
|
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i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
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|
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flush,nowarn
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Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not
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warn when a VM is started in a potentially
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insecure configuration.
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off
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Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
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emit any warnings.
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Default is 'flush'.
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For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
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l2cr= [PPC]
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l3cr= [PPC]
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@ -2716,6 +2790,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
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nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
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Equivalent to smt=1.
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[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
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nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
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via the sysfs control file.
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|
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nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
|
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(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
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allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
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|
|
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610
Documentation/l1tf.rst
Normal file
610
Documentation/l1tf.rst
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
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L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
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========================
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L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
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speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
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when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
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for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
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Affected processors
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-------------------
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This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
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vulnerability is not present on:
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- Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
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|
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- Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
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||||
|
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- A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
|
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Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
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|
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- The Intel XEON PHI family
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|
||||
- Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
|
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IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
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||||
by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
|
||||
available by end of 2018.
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|
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Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
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vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
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|
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Related CVEs
|
||||
------------
|
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|
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The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
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||||
|
||||
============= ================= ==============================
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CVE-2018-3615 L1 Terminal Fault SGX related aspects
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CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
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CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
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||||
============= ================= ==============================
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Problem
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-------
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If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
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table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
|
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then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
|
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data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
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by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
|
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|
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While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
|
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a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
|
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data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
|
||||
opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
|
||||
similar to the Meltdown attack.
|
||||
|
||||
While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
|
||||
allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
|
||||
works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
|
||||
works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
|
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extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
|
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|
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|
||||
Attack scenarios
|
||||
----------------
|
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|
||||
1. Malicious user space
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
|
||||
PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
|
||||
application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
|
||||
In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
|
||||
encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
|
||||
deterministic and more practical.
|
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|
||||
The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
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||||
inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
|
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impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
|
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marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
|
||||
|
||||
A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
|
||||
malicious user space applications.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
|
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
|
||||
OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
|
||||
space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
|
||||
PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
|
||||
|
||||
A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
|
||||
multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
|
||||
HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
|
||||
share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
|
||||
only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
|
||||
on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
|
||||
the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
|
||||
core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
|
||||
|
||||
If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
|
||||
only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
|
||||
effective (shadow) page tables.
|
||||
|
||||
While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
|
||||
mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
|
||||
can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
|
||||
mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
|
||||
deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
|
||||
are described in the next sections.
|
||||
|
||||
The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
|
||||
at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _l1tf_sys_info:
|
||||
|
||||
L1TF system information
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
|
||||
status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
|
||||
mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
|
||||
|
||||
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
|
||||
|
||||
The possible values in this file are:
|
||||
|
||||
=========================== ===============================
|
||||
'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
|
||||
'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' The host protection is active
|
||||
=========================== ===============================
|
||||
|
||||
If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
|
||||
information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
|
||||
|
||||
- SMT status:
|
||||
|
||||
===================== ================
|
||||
'VMX: SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
|
||||
'VMX: SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
|
||||
===================== ================
|
||||
|
||||
- L1D Flush mode:
|
||||
|
||||
================================ ====================================
|
||||
'L1D vulnerable' L1D flushing is disabled
|
||||
|
||||
'L1D conditional cache flushes' L1D flush is conditionally enabled
|
||||
|
||||
'L1D cache flushes' L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
|
||||
================================ ====================================
|
||||
|
||||
The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Host mitigation mechanism
|
||||
-------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
|
||||
user space running on the host.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Guest mitigation mechanisms
|
||||
---------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
.. _l1d_flush:
|
||||
|
||||
1. L1D flush on VMENTER
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
|
||||
the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
|
||||
|
||||
Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
|
||||
by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
|
||||
data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
|
||||
bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
|
||||
frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
|
||||
performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
|
||||
scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
|
||||
minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
|
||||
confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
|
||||
application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
|
||||
- conditional ('cond')
|
||||
- unconditional ('always')
|
||||
|
||||
The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
|
||||
only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
|
||||
paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
|
||||
interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
|
||||
address space layout of the hypervisor.
|
||||
|
||||
Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
|
||||
maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
|
||||
mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
|
||||
workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
|
||||
|
||||
The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
|
||||
defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
|
||||
sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
|
||||
attackable again.
|
||||
|
||||
L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
|
||||
line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
|
||||
and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _guest_confinement:
|
||||
|
||||
2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
|
||||
guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
|
||||
that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
|
||||
host tasks can run on these cores.
|
||||
|
||||
If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
|
||||
the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
|
||||
restricted parts of the host memory.
|
||||
|
||||
Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
|
||||
host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
|
||||
of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
|
||||
which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
|
||||
threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
|
||||
declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
|
||||
the code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
|
||||
the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
|
||||
negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
|
||||
scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
|
||||
scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
|
||||
of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
|
||||
|
||||
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
|
||||
|
||||
.. _interrupt_isolation:
|
||||
|
||||
3. Interrupt affinity
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
|
||||
true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
|
||||
interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
|
||||
devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
|
||||
queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
|
||||
|
||||
Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
|
||||
which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
|
||||
|
||||
Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
|
||||
guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
|
||||
configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
|
||||
of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
|
||||
information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
|
||||
is no way to make general assumptions.
|
||||
|
||||
Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
|
||||
/proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
|
||||
available at:
|
||||
|
||||
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
|
||||
|
||||
.. _smt_control:
|
||||
|
||||
4. SMT control
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
|
||||
completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
|
||||
the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
|
||||
The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
|
||||
of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
|
||||
to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
|
||||
control SMT.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
|
||||
|
||||
=========== ==========================================================
|
||||
nosmt Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
|
||||
kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
|
||||
boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
|
||||
core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
|
||||
activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
|
||||
to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
|
||||
to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
|
||||
again. "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
|
||||
|
||||
nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
|
||||
undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
|
||||
=========== ==========================================================
|
||||
|
||||
The sysfs interface provides two files:
|
||||
|
||||
- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
|
||||
- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
|
||||
|
||||
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
|
||||
|
||||
This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
|
||||
ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
|
||||
|
||||
============== ===================================================
|
||||
on SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
|
||||
logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
|
||||
restrictions.
|
||||
|
||||
off SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
|
||||
the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
|
||||
and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
|
||||
online a non-primary sibling is rejected
|
||||
|
||||
forceoff Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
|
||||
Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
notsupported The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
|
||||
not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
|
||||
Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
|
||||
============== ===================================================
|
||||
|
||||
The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
|
||||
state are:
|
||||
|
||||
- on
|
||||
- off
|
||||
- forceoff
|
||||
|
||||
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
|
||||
|
||||
This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
|
||||
physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
|
||||
line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Disabling EPT
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
|
||||
with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
|
||||
managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
|
||||
significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
|
||||
KPTI is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
|
||||
address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
|
||||
|
||||
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
|
||||
---------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
|
||||
time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
|
||||
|
||||
============ =============================================================
|
||||
full Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
|
||||
vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
|
||||
the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
|
||||
is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
|
||||
warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
|
||||
insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
|
||||
disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
full,force Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
|
||||
control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
|
||||
(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
|
||||
|
||||
flush Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
|
||||
mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
|
||||
is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
|
||||
warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
|
||||
insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
|
||||
disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
flush,nosmt Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
|
||||
i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
|
||||
is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
|
||||
warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
|
||||
insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
|
||||
disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
flush,nowarn Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
|
||||
started in a potentially insecure configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
|
||||
warnings.
|
||||
============ =============================================================
|
||||
|
||||
The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
|
||||
|
||||
Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
|
||||
entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
|
||||
following arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
============ ==============================================================
|
||||
always L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
|
||||
|
||||
cond Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
|
||||
VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
|
||||
interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
|
||||
which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
|
||||
|
||||
never Disables the mitigation
|
||||
============ ==============================================================
|
||||
|
||||
The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
|
||||
parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
|
||||
file:
|
||||
|
||||
/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
|
||||
|
||||
The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
|
||||
line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
|
||||
module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Mitigation selection guide
|
||||
--------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
1. No virtualization in use
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
|
||||
action is required.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Virtualization with trusted guests
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
|
||||
guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
|
||||
protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
|
||||
administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
|
||||
sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
|
||||
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
|
||||
the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
|
||||
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
|
||||
the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
|
||||
VMENTER is not required.
|
||||
|
||||
EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
|
||||
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
|
||||
mitigations can be employed:
|
||||
|
||||
- L1D flushing on VMENTER:
|
||||
|
||||
L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
|
||||
is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Guest confinement:
|
||||
|
||||
Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
|
||||
are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
|
||||
significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
|
||||
still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
|
||||
:ref:`guest_confinement`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Interrupt isolation:
|
||||
|
||||
Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
|
||||
further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
|
||||
of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
|
||||
about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
|
||||
affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
|
||||
the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
|
||||
which might expose valuable information. See
|
||||
:ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
|
||||
|
||||
The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
|
||||
certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
|
||||
carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
|
||||
available:
|
||||
|
||||
- Disabling SMT:
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
|
||||
amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
|
||||
above mitigation methods.
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
|
||||
parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
|
||||
time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Disabling EPT:
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
|
||||
not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
|
||||
enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
|
||||
significant.
|
||||
|
||||
EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
|
||||
parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
3.4. Nested virtual machines
|
||||
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
|
||||
the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
|
||||
machine. VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
|
||||
guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
|
||||
bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
|
||||
|
||||
- Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
|
||||
nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
|
||||
exposed to the nested virtual machine;
|
||||
|
||||
- Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
|
||||
the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
|
||||
cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
|
||||
nested virtual machine;
|
||||
|
||||
- Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
|
||||
is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
.. _default_mitigations:
|
||||
|
||||
Default mitigations
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
|
||||
|
||||
- PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
|
||||
unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
|
||||
|
||||
- L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
|
||||
a guest.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
|
||||
SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
The rationale for this choice is:
|
||||
|
||||
- Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
|
||||
unattended updates.
|
||||
|
||||
- If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
|
||||
just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
|
||||
guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
|
||||
on their machines blindly.
|
||||
|
||||
- It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
|
||||
impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
|
||||
mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
|
||||
control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
|
||||
be possible, then the default might be different.
|
||||
|
||||
- The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
|
||||
analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
|
||||
mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
|
||||
machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
|
||||
There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
|
||||
kind of scenarios.
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,14 +122,15 @@ KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL and use the flag KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL as
|
|||
privileged user (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST
|
||||
4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
|
||||
|
||||
Capability: basic
|
||||
Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES for KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
|
||||
Architectures: x86
|
||||
Type: system
|
||||
Type: system ioctl
|
||||
Parameters: struct kvm_msr_list (in/out)
|
||||
Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
|
||||
Errors:
|
||||
EFAULT: the msr index list cannot be read from or written to
|
||||
E2BIG: the msr index list is to be to fit in the array specified by
|
||||
the user.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -138,16 +139,23 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
|
|||
__u32 indices[0];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
This ioctl returns the guest msrs that are supported. The list varies
|
||||
by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise. The
|
||||
user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
|
||||
kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in
|
||||
the indices array with their numbers.
|
||||
The user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
|
||||
kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in the
|
||||
indices array with their numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST returns the guest msrs that are supported. The list
|
||||
varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: if kvm indicates supports MCE (KVM_CAP_MCE), then the MCE bank MSRs are
|
||||
not returned in the MSR list, as different vcpus can have a different number
|
||||
of banks, as set via the KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE ioctl.
|
||||
|
||||
KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST returns the list of MSRs that can be passed
|
||||
to the KVM_GET_MSRS system ioctl. This lets userspace probe host capabilities
|
||||
and processor features that are exposed via MSRs (e.g., VMX capabilities).
|
||||
This list also varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change
|
||||
otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4.4 KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -474,14 +482,22 @@ Support for this has been removed. Use KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG instead.
|
|||
|
||||
4.18 KVM_GET_MSRS
|
||||
|
||||
Capability: basic
|
||||
Capability: basic (vcpu), KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES (system)
|
||||
Architectures: x86
|
||||
Type: vcpu ioctl
|
||||
Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
|
||||
Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in/out)
|
||||
Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
|
||||
Returns: number of msrs successfully returned;
|
||||
-1 on error
|
||||
|
||||
When used as a system ioctl:
|
||||
Reads the values of MSR-based features that are available for the VM. This
|
||||
is similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it returns MSR indices and values.
|
||||
The list of msr-based features can be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
|
||||
in a system ioctl.
|
||||
|
||||
When used as a vcpu ioctl:
|
||||
Reads model-specific registers from the vcpu. Supported msr indices can
|
||||
be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.
|
||||
be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST in a system ioctl.
|
||||
|
||||
struct kvm_msrs {
|
||||
__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
2
Makefile
2
Makefile
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
VERSION = 4
|
||||
PATCHLEVEL = 9
|
||||
SUBLEVEL = 119
|
||||
SUBLEVEL = 120
|
||||
EXTRAVERSION =
|
||||
NAME = Roaring Lionus
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
|
|||
config KEXEC_CORE
|
||||
bool
|
||||
|
||||
config HOTPLUG_SMT
|
||||
bool
|
||||
|
||||
config OPROFILE
|
||||
tristate "OProfile system profiling"
|
||||
depends on PROFILING
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@
|
|||
/* non-prefetchable memory */
|
||||
0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
|
||||
num-lanes = <1>;
|
||||
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
|
||||
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
|
||||
clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
|
||||
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
|
||||
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ config PREFETCH
|
|||
|
||||
config MLONGCALLS
|
||||
bool "Enable the -mlong-calls compiler option for big kernels"
|
||||
def_bool y if (!MODULES)
|
||||
default y
|
||||
depends on PA8X00
|
||||
help
|
||||
If you configure the kernel to include many drivers built-in instead
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
32
arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h
Normal file
32
arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
||||
#ifndef __ASM_BARRIER_H
|
||||
#define __ASM_BARRIER_H
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
|
||||
|
||||
/* The synchronize caches instruction executes as a nop on systems in
|
||||
which all memory references are performed in order. */
|
||||
#define synchronize_caches() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
|
||||
#define mb() do { synchronize_caches(); } while (0)
|
||||
#define rmb() mb()
|
||||
#define wmb() mb()
|
||||
#define dma_rmb() mb()
|
||||
#define dma_wmb() mb()
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define mb() barrier()
|
||||
#define rmb() barrier()
|
||||
#define wmb() barrier()
|
||||
#define dma_rmb() barrier()
|
||||
#define dma_wmb() barrier()
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define __smp_mb() mb()
|
||||
#define __smp_rmb() mb()
|
||||
#define __smp_wmb() mb()
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
|
||||
#endif /* __ASM_BARRIER_H */
|
||||
|
|
@ -481,6 +481,8 @@
|
|||
/* Release pa_tlb_lock lock without reloading lock address. */
|
||||
.macro tlb_unlock0 spc,tmp
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
||||
or,COND(=) %r0,\spc,%r0
|
||||
sync
|
||||
or,COND(=) %r0,\spc,%r0
|
||||
stw \spc,0(\tmp)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ ENDPROC_CFI(flush_data_cache_local)
|
|||
.macro tlb_unlock la,flags,tmp
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
||||
ldi 1,\tmp
|
||||
sync
|
||||
stw \tmp,0(\la)
|
||||
mtsm \flags
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -633,6 +633,7 @@ cas_action:
|
|||
sub,<> %r28, %r25, %r0
|
||||
2: stw,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
|
||||
/* Free lock */
|
||||
sync
|
||||
stw,ma %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
|
||||
#if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
|
||||
/* Clear thread register indicator */
|
||||
|
|
@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ cas_action:
|
|||
3:
|
||||
/* Error occurred on load or store */
|
||||
/* Free lock */
|
||||
sync
|
||||
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
|
||||
#if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
|
||||
stw %r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
|
||||
|
|
@ -848,6 +850,7 @@ cas2_action:
|
|||
|
||||
cas2_end:
|
||||
/* Free lock */
|
||||
sync
|
||||
stw,ma %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
|
||||
/* Enable interrupts */
|
||||
ssm PSW_SM_I, %r0
|
||||
|
|
@ -858,6 +861,7 @@ cas2_end:
|
|||
22:
|
||||
/* Error occurred on load or store */
|
||||
/* Free lock */
|
||||
sync
|
||||
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
|
||||
ssm PSW_SM_I, %r0
|
||||
ldo 1(%r0),%r28
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ config X86
|
|||
select HAVE_UID16 if X86_32 || IA32_EMULATION
|
||||
select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
|
||||
select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
|
||||
select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP
|
||||
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
|
||||
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if X86_64
|
||||
select MODULES_USE_ELF_REL if X86_32
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
|
|||
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/msr.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/idle.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/hardirq.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#define ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -633,6 +634,13 @@ extern int default_check_phys_apicid_present(int phys_apicid);
|
|||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
||||
bool apic_id_is_primary_thread(unsigned int id);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static inline bool apic_id_is_primary_thread(unsigned int id) { return false; }
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
extern void irq_enter(void);
|
||||
extern void irq_exit(void);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -640,6 +648,7 @@ static inline void entering_irq(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
irq_enter();
|
||||
exit_idle();
|
||||
kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void entering_ack_irq(void)
|
||||
|
|
@ -652,6 +661,7 @@ static inline void ipi_entering_ack_irq(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
irq_enter();
|
||||
ack_APIC_irq();
|
||||
kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void exiting_irq(void)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
|
|||
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
|
||||
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
|
||||
|
|
@ -317,6 +317,7 @@
|
|||
#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D (18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
|
||||
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -349,5 +350,6 @@
|
|||
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
|
||||
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
|
||||
#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
|
||||
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
#include <linux/compiler.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/init.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/io.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/io.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/setup.h>
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline __init void *dmi_alloc(unsigned len)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
|
|||
#define _ASM_X86_HARDIRQ_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/threads.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/irq.h>
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
unsigned int __softirq_pending;
|
||||
u16 __softirq_pending;
|
||||
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
|
||||
u8 kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
unsigned int __nmi_count; /* arch dependent */
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
|
||||
unsigned int apic_timer_irqs; /* arch dependent */
|
||||
|
|
@ -60,4 +62,24 @@ extern u64 arch_irq_stat_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
|
|||
extern u64 arch_irq_stat(void);
|
||||
#define arch_irq_stat arch_irq_stat
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
|
||||
static inline void kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
__this_cpu_write(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
__this_cpu_write(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return __this_cpu_read(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) */
|
||||
static inline void kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(void) { }
|
||||
#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) */
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* _ASM_X86_HARDIRQ_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
|
|||
* Interrupt control:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */
|
||||
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void);
|
||||
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long flags;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
|
|||
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/irq_work.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/irq.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/kvm.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -485,6 +486,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
|
|||
u64 smbase;
|
||||
bool tpr_access_reporting;
|
||||
u64 ia32_xss;
|
||||
u64 microcode_version;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Paging state of the vcpu
|
||||
|
|
@ -659,6 +661,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
|
|||
|
||||
int pending_ioapic_eoi;
|
||||
int pending_external_vector;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Flush the L1 Data cache for L1TF mitigation on VMENTER */
|
||||
bool l1tf_flush_l1d;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct kvm_lpage_info {
|
||||
|
|
@ -819,6 +824,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_stat {
|
|||
u64 signal_exits;
|
||||
u64 irq_window_exits;
|
||||
u64 nmi_window_exits;
|
||||
u64 l1d_flush;
|
||||
u64 halt_exits;
|
||||
u64 halt_successful_poll;
|
||||
u64 halt_attempted_poll;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1020,6 +1026,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
|
|||
void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
int (*get_msr_feature)(struct kvm_msr_entry *entry);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1338,6 +1346,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
|||
void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(struct kvm *kvm,
|
||||
unsigned long address);
|
||||
|
||||
u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void);
|
||||
void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
|
||||
int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more
Loading…
Reference in a new issue