diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 58d378b4d00d..baee9e209f13 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1363,6 +1363,11 @@
  * @bpf_prog_free_security:
  *	Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
  *
+ * @locked_down
+ *     Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary
+ *     code execution in kernel space should be permitted.
+ *
+ *     @what: kernel feature being accessed
  */
 
 union security_list_options {
@@ -1708,6 +1713,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*perf_event_write)(struct perf_event *event);
 
 #endif
+	int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
 };
 
 struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -1939,6 +1945,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct hlist_head perf_event_read;
 	struct hlist_head perf_event_write;
 #endif
+	struct hlist_head locked_down;
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e4f6ad40ee2c..c67d1528cdbd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -69,6 +69,33 @@ struct audit_krule;
 struct user_namespace;
 struct timezone;
 
+/*
+ * These are reasons that can be passed to the security_locked_down()
+ * LSM hook. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel integrity (ie, the
+ * ability for userland to modify kernel code) are placed before
+ * LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX.  Lockdown reasons that protect kernel
+ * confidentiality (ie, the ability for userland to extract
+ * information from the running kernel that would otherwise be
+ * restricted) are placed before LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX.
+ *
+ * LSM authors should note that the semantics of any given lockdown
+ * reason are not guaranteed to be stable - the same reason may block
+ * one set of features in one kernel release, and a slightly different
+ * set of features in a later kernel release. LSMs that seek to expose
+ * lockdown policy at any level of granularity other than "none",
+ * "integrity" or "confidentiality" are responsible for either
+ * ensuring that they expose a consistent level of functionality to
+ * userland, or ensuring that userland is aware that this is
+ * potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information
+ * in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do
+ * so.
+ */
+enum lockdown_reason {
+	LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
+	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
+};
+
 /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
 extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		       int cap, int audit);
@@ -377,6 +404,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
 };
@@ -1167,6 +1195,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c085c5920d7e..d46a3b8800d1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1741,3 +1741,10 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+