This is the 4.9.107 stable release

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Merge 4.9.107 into android-4.9

Changes in 4.9.107
	arm64: lse: Add early clobbers to some input/output asm operands
	powerpc/64s: Clear PCR on boot
	USB: serial: cp210x: use tcflag_t to fix incompatible pointer type
	Revert "pinctrl: msm: Use dynamic GPIO numbering"
	xfs: detect agfl count corruption and reset agfl
	Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"
	Input: elan_i2c_smbus - fix corrupted stack
	tracing: Fix crash when freeing instances with event triggers
	selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
	cfg80211: further limit wiphy names to 64 bytes
	dma-buf: remove redundant initialization of sg_table
	rtlwifi: rtl8192cu: Remove variable self-assignment in rf.c
	ASoC: Intel: sst: remove redundant variable dma_dev_name
	platform/chrome: cros_ec_lpc: remove redundant pointer request
	x86/amd: revert commit 944e0fc51a
	xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()
	x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen
	tcp: avoid integer overflows in tcp_rcv_space_adjust()
	scsi: ufs: fix failure to read the string descriptor
	scsi: ufs: refactor device descriptor reading
	scsi: ufs: Factor out ufshcd_read_desc_param
	arm64: Add hypervisor safe helper for checking constant capabilities
	arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Move out of HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR #ifdef
	powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
	powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
	powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
	powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
	powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
	powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
	powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
	powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
	powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
	powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
	powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
	powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
	powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
	powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
	powerpc: Move default security feature flags
	powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
	powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush()
	powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit
	net/mlx4_en: fix potential use-after-free with dma_unmap_page
	iio:kfifo_buf: check for uint overflow
	MIPS: ptrace: Fix PTRACE_PEEKUSR requests for 64-bit FGRs
	MIPS: prctl: Disallow FRE without FR with PR_SET_FP_MODE requests
	scsi: scsi_transport_srp: Fix shost to rport translation
	stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map
	hwtracing: stm: fix build error on some arches
	IB/core: Fix error code for invalid GID entry
	drm/psr: Fix missed entry in PSR setup time table.
	drm/i915: Disable LVDS on Radiant P845
	sparc64: Fix build warnings with gcc 7.
	fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race
	mm: fix the NULL mapping case in __isolate_lru_page()
	sparc64: Don't clibber fixed registers in __multi4.
	serial: pl011: add console matching function
	Linux 4.9.107

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-06-06 18:34:12 +02:00
commit 42a730adb6
60 changed files with 1275 additions and 295 deletions

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
SUBLEVEL = 106
SUBLEVEL = 107
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus

View file

@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline void atomic_and(int i, atomic_t *v)
/* LSE atomics */
" mvn %w[i], %w[i]\n"
" stclr %w[i], %[v]")
: [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: "r" (x1)
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS);
}
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_and##name(int i, atomic_t *v) \
/* LSE atomics */ \
" mvn %w[i], %w[i]\n" \
" ldclr" #mb " %w[i], %w[i], %[v]") \
: [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \
\
@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static inline void atomic_sub(int i, atomic_t *v)
/* LSE atomics */
" neg %w[i], %w[i]\n"
" stadd %w[i], %[v]")
: [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: "r" (x1)
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS);
}
@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static inline int atomic_sub_return##name(int i, atomic_t *v) \
" neg %w[i], %w[i]\n" \
" ldadd" #mb " %w[i], w30, %[v]\n" \
" add %w[i], %w[i], w30") \
: [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS , ##cl); \
\
@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_sub##name(int i, atomic_t *v) \
/* LSE atomics */ \
" neg %w[i], %w[i]\n" \
" ldadd" #mb " %w[i], %w[i], %[v]") \
: [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \
\
@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static inline void atomic64_and(long i, atomic64_t *v)
/* LSE atomics */
" mvn %[i], %[i]\n"
" stclr %[i], %[v]")
: [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: "r" (x1)
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS);
}
@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_fetch_and##name(long i, atomic64_t *v) \
/* LSE atomics */ \
" mvn %[i], %[i]\n" \
" ldclr" #mb " %[i], %[i], %[v]") \
: [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \
\
@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static inline void atomic64_sub(long i, atomic64_t *v)
/* LSE atomics */
" neg %[i], %[i]\n"
" stadd %[i], %[v]")
: [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter)
: "r" (x1)
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS);
}
@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_sub_return##name(long i, atomic64_t *v) \
" neg %[i], %[i]\n" \
" ldadd" #mb " %[i], x30, %[v]\n" \
" add %[i], %[i], x30") \
: [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \
\
@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_fetch_sub##name(long i, atomic64_t *v) \
/* LSE atomics */ \
" neg %[i], %[i]\n" \
" ldadd" #mb " %[i], %[i], %[v]") \
: [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \
: "r" (x1) \
: __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \
\
@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline long __cmpxchg_double##name(unsigned long old1, \
" eor %[old1], %[old1], %[oldval1]\n" \
" eor %[old2], %[old2], %[oldval2]\n" \
" orr %[old1], %[old1], %[old2]") \
: [old1] "+r" (x0), [old2] "+r" (x1), \
: [old1] "+&r" (x0), [old2] "+&r" (x1), \
[v] "+Q" (*(unsigned long *)ptr) \
: [new1] "r" (x2), [new2] "r" (x3), [ptr] "r" (x4), \
[oldval1] "r" (oldval1), [oldval2] "r" (oldval2) \

View file

@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
#ifndef __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H
#define __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <asm/cpucaps.h>
#include <asm/hwcap.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
@ -27,6 +25,8 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
/* CPU feature register tracking */
@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
extern DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS);
extern struct static_key_false cpu_hwcap_keys[ARM64_NCAPS];
extern struct static_key_false arm64_const_caps_ready;
bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap);
@ -104,14 +105,27 @@ static inline bool cpu_have_feature(unsigned int num)
return elf_hwcap & (1UL << num);
}
/* System capability check for constant caps */
static inline bool __cpus_have_const_cap(int num)
{
if (num >= ARM64_NCAPS)
return false;
return static_branch_unlikely(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
}
static inline bool cpus_have_cap(unsigned int num)
{
if (num >= ARM64_NCAPS)
return false;
if (__builtin_constant_p(num))
return static_branch_unlikely(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
return test_bit(num, cpu_hwcaps);
}
static inline bool cpus_have_const_cap(int num)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&arm64_const_caps_ready))
return __cpus_have_const_cap(num);
else
return test_bit(num, cpu_hwcaps);
return cpus_have_cap(num);
}
static inline void cpus_set_cap(unsigned int num)
@ -121,7 +135,6 @@ static inline void cpus_set_cap(unsigned int num)
num, ARM64_NCAPS);
} else {
__set_bit(num, cpu_hwcaps);
static_branch_enable(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
}
}
@ -200,7 +213,7 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void)
static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void)
{
return cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0);
return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0);
}
static inline bool system_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void)

View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/kvm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@ -358,9 +359,12 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(phys_addr_t pgd_ptr,
unsigned long vector_ptr)
{
/*
* Call initialization code, and switch to the full blown
* HYP code.
* Call initialization code, and switch to the full blown HYP code.
* If the cpucaps haven't been finalized yet, something has gone very
* wrong, and hyp will crash and burn when it uses any
* cpus_have_const_cap() wrapper.
*/
BUG_ON(!static_branch_likely(&arm64_const_caps_ready));
__kvm_call_hyp((void *)pgd_ptr, hyp_stack_ptr, vector_ptr);
}
@ -398,7 +402,7 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_stage2(void)
static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
{
return cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR);
return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR);
}
#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */

View file

@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
vect = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start +
data->hyp_vectors_slot * SZ_2K;
if (!cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN))
if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN))
vect = lm_alias(vect);
}

View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ typedef struct {
static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
{
return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) &&
cpus_have_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
}
typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);

View file

@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
* ThunderX leads to apparent I-cache corruption of kernel text, which
* ends as well as you might imagine. Don't even try.
*/
if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456)) {
if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456)) {
str = "ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456";
__kpti_forced = -1;
}
@ -1053,8 +1053,16 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
*/
void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps)
{
for (; caps->matches; caps++)
if (caps->enable && cpus_have_cap(caps->capability))
for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
unsigned int num = caps->capability;
if (!cpus_have_cap(num))
continue;
/* Ensure cpus_have_const_cap(num) works */
static_branch_enable(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
if (caps->enable) {
/*
* Use stop_machine() as it schedules the work allowing
* us to modify PSTATE, instead of on_each_cpu() which
@ -1062,6 +1070,8 @@ void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps)
* we return.
*/
stop_machine(caps->enable, (void *)caps, cpu_online_mask);
}
}
}
/*
@ -1165,6 +1175,14 @@ static void __init setup_feature_capabilities(void)
enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features);
}
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_const_caps_ready);
static void __init mark_const_caps_ready(void)
{
static_branch_enable(&arm64_const_caps_ready);
}
extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap)
@ -1181,6 +1199,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */
setup_feature_capabilities();
enable_errata_workarounds();
mark_const_caps_ready();
setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
@ -1205,5 +1224,5 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
static bool __maybe_unused
cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
{
return (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_PAN) && !cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO));
return (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_PAN) && !cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO));
}

View file

@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
childregs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL1h;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_UAO) &&
cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO))
cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO))
childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT;
p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = stack_start;
p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = stk_sz;

View file

@ -699,6 +699,10 @@ int mips_set_process_fp_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int value)
if (value & ~known_bits)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Setting FRE without FR is not supported. */
if ((value & (PR_FP_MODE_FR | PR_FP_MODE_FRE)) == PR_FP_MODE_FRE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Avoid inadvertently triggering emulation */
if ((value & PR_FP_MODE_FR) && raw_cpu_has_fpu &&
!(raw_current_cpu_data.fpu_id & MIPS_FPIR_F64))

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@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
break;
}
#endif
tmp = get_fpr32(&fregs[addr - FPR_BASE], 0);
tmp = get_fpr64(&fregs[addr - FPR_BASE], 0);
break;
case PC:
tmp = regs->cp0_epc;

View file

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
addr & 1);
break;
}
tmp = get_fpr32(&fregs[addr - FPR_BASE], 0);
tmp = get_fpr64(&fregs[addr - FPR_BASE], 0);
break;
case PC:
tmp = regs->cp0_epc;

View file

@ -51,6 +51,27 @@
#define EX_PPR 88 /* SMT thread status register (priority) */
#define EX_CTR 96
#define STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT \
STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_FIXUP_SECTION; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop
#define STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_FIXUP_SECTION; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop; \
nop
/*
* r10 must be free to use, r13 must be paca
*/
#define INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL \
STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT
/*
* Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
*
@ -67,16 +88,19 @@
rfid
#define RFI_TO_USER \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
#define RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
#define RFI_TO_GUEST \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
rfid; \
b rfi_flush_fallback
@ -85,21 +109,25 @@
hrfid
#define HRFI_TO_USER \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_GUEST \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
#define HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN \
STF_EXIT_BARRIER_SLOT; \
RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
hrfid; \
b hrfi_flush_fallback
@ -225,6 +253,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(ftr,ftr,943)
#define __EXCEPTION_PROLOG_1(area, extra, vec) \
OPT_SAVE_REG_TO_PACA(area+EX_PPR, r9, CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR); \
OPT_SAVE_REG_TO_PACA(area+EX_CFAR, r10, CPU_FTR_CFAR); \
INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL; \
SAVE_CTR(r10, area); \
mfcr r9; \
extra(vec); \

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@ -189,6 +189,22 @@ void apply_feature_fixups(void);
void setup_feature_keys(void);
#endif
#define STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_FIXUP_SECTION \
953: \
.pushsection __stf_entry_barrier_fixup,"a"; \
.align 2; \
954: \
FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 953b-954b; \
.popsection;
#define STF_EXIT_BARRIER_FIXUP_SECTION \
955: \
.pushsection __stf_exit_barrier_fixup,"a"; \
.align 2; \
956: \
FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b; \
.popsection;
#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \
951: \
.pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
@ -200,6 +216,9 @@ void setup_feature_keys(void);
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
extern long stf_barrier_fallback;
extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;
extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup;
extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
#endif

View file

@ -313,6 +313,9 @@
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3
#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4
#define H_CPU_CHAR_BRANCH_HINTS_HONORED (1ull << 58) // IBM bit 5
#define H_CPU_CHAR_THREAD_RECONFIG_CTRL (1ull << 57) // IBM bit 6
#define H_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED (1ull << 56) // IBM bit 7
#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1

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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
/*
* Security related feature bit definitions.
*
* Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
*/
#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
extern unsigned long powerpc_security_features;
extern bool rfi_flush;
/* These are bit flags */
enum stf_barrier_type {
STF_BARRIER_NONE = 0x1,
STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK = 0x2,
STF_BARRIER_EIEIO = 0x4,
STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI = 0x8,
};
void setup_stf_barrier(void);
void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types);
static inline void security_ftr_set(unsigned long feature)
{
powerpc_security_features |= feature;
}
static inline void security_ftr_clear(unsigned long feature)
{
powerpc_security_features &= ~feature;
}
static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
{
return !!(powerpc_security_features & feature);
}
// Features indicating support for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
// The L1-D cache can be flushed with ori r30,r30,0
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 0x0000000000000001ull
// The L1-D cache can be flushed with mtspr 882,r0 (aka SPRN_TRIG2)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 0x0000000000000002ull
// ori r31,r31,0 acts as a speculation barrier
#define SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 0x0000000000000004ull
// Speculation past bctr is disabled
#define SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED 0x0000000000000008ull
// Entries in L1-D are private to a SMT thread
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV 0x0000000000000010ull
// Indirect branch prediction cache disabled
#define SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED 0x0000000000000020ull
// Features indicating need for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[HV] 1->0 transition (hypervisor to guest)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV 0x0000000000000040ull
// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[PR] 0->1 transition (kernel to userspace)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR 0x0000000000000080ull
// A speculation barrier should be used for bounds checks (Spectre variant 1)
#define SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR 0x0000000000000100ull
// Firmware configuration indicates user favours security over performance
#define SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY 0x0000000000000200ull
// Features enabled by default
#define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \
SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */

View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ enum l1d_flush_type {
L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8,
};
void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */

View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += setup_64.o sys_ppc32.o \
obj-$(CONFIG_VDSO32) += vdso32/
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT) += hw_breakpoint.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_ppc970.o cpu_setup_pa6t.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_power.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_power.o security.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += mce.o mce_power.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64) += exceptions-64e.o idle_book3e.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += vdso64/

View file

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power7)
beqlr
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
bl __init_LPCR
bl __init_tlb_power7
@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power7)
beqlr
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
bl __init_LPCR
bl __init_tlb_power7
@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power8)
beqlr
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
ori r3, r3, LPCR_PECEDH
bl __init_LPCR
@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power8)
beqlr
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
ori r3, r3, LPCR_PECEDH
bl __init_LPCR
@ -98,6 +102,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power9)
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r4, LPCR_PECEDH | LPCR_PECE_HVEE | LPCR_HVICE)
or r3, r3, r4
@ -121,6 +126,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power9)
li r0,0
mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PID,r0
mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0
mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r4, LPCR_PECEDH | LPCR_PECE_HVEE | LPCR_HVICE)
or r3, r3, r4

View file

@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_TM)
#endif
EXC_REAL_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x900, 0x980)
EXC_REAL_OOL_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x900, 0x980)
EXC_VIRT_MASKABLE(decrementer, 0x4900, 0x4980, 0x900)
TRAMP_KVM(PACA_EXGEN, 0x900)
EXC_COMMON_ASYNC(decrementer_common, 0x900, timer_interrupt)
@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION \
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_REAL_LE) \
mr r9,r13 ; \
GET_PACA(r13) ; \
INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL ; \
mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0 ; \
0:
@ -1353,6 +1354,19 @@ masked_##_H##interrupt: \
##_H##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b .
TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(stf_barrier_fallback)
std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
sync
ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
ori 31,31,0
.rept 14
b 1f
1:
.endr
blr
/*
* Real mode exceptions actually use this too, but alternate
* instruction code patches (which end up in the common .text area)

View file

@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
//
// Security related flags and so on.
//
// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
#include <asm/security_features.h>
unsigned long powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT;
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
bool thread_priv;
thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV);
if (rfi_flush || thread_priv) {
struct seq_buf s;
seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
if (rfi_flush)
seq_buf_printf(&s, "RFI Flush");
if (rfi_flush && thread_priv)
seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
if (thread_priv)
seq_buf_printf(&s, "L1D private per thread");
seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
return s.len;
}
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
bool bcs, ccd, ori;
struct seq_buf s;
seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
ori = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31);
if (bcs || ccd) {
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
if (bcs)
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
if (bcs && ccd)
seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
if (ccd)
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
} else
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
if (ori)
seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
return s.len;
}
/*
* Store-forwarding barrier support.
*/
static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types;
static bool no_stf_barrier;
bool stf_barrier;
static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p)
{
pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line.");
no_stf_barrier = true;
return 0;
}
early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier);
/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p)
{
if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) {
/* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */
return 0;
} else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) {
handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
return 0;
} else
return 1;
return 0;
}
early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd);
/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p)
{
handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
return 0;
}
early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd);
static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable)
{
if (enable)
do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types);
else
do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE);
stf_barrier = enable;
}
void setup_stf_barrier(void)
{
enum stf_barrier_type type;
bool enable, hv;
hv = cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE);
/* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
type = STF_BARRIER_EIEIO;
else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI;
else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206))
type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK;
else
type = STF_BARRIER_NONE;
enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
(security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) ||
(security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && hv));
if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) {
pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n");
} else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n");
} else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n");
}
stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
if (!no_stf_barrier)
stf_barrier_enable(enable);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) {
const char *type;
switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) {
case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO:
type = "eieio";
break;
case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI:
type = "hwsync";
break;
case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK:
type = "fallback";
break;
default:
type = "unknown";
}
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type);
}
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
bool enable;
if (val == 1)
enable = true;
else if (val == 0)
enable = false;
else
return -EINVAL;
/* Only do anything if we're changing state */
if (enable != stf_barrier)
stf_barrier_enable(enable);
return 0;
}
static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
*val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set, "%llu\n");
static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
{
debugfs_create_file("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_stf_barrier);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */

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