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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
/*
* include/linux/random.h
*
* Include file for the random number generator.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
random: Add callback API for random pool readiness The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way of calling it from within the kernel. This patch replaces it with a callback API instead. The callback is invoked potentially from interrupt context so the user needs to schedule their own work thread if necessary. In addition to adding callbacks, they can also be removed as otherwise this opens up a way for user-space to allocate kernel memory with no bound (by opening algif_rng descriptors and then closing them). Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-06-09 18:19:39 +08:00
#include <linux/list.h>
random32: add prandom_init_once helper for own rngs Add a prandom_init_once() facility that works on the rnd_state, so that users that are keeping their own state independent from prandom_u32() can initialize their taus113 per cpu states. The motivation here is similar to net_get_random_once(): initialize the state as late as possible in the hope that enough entropy has been collected for the seeding. prandom_init_once() makes use of the recently introduced prandom_seed_full_state() helper and is generic enough so that it could also be used on fast-paths due to the DO_ONCE(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 01:20:38 +02:00
#include <linux/once.h>
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-10-13 10:46:48 +01:00
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
random: Add callback API for random pool readiness The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way of calling it from within the kernel. This patch replaces it with a callback API instead. The callback is invoked potentially from interrupt context so the user needs to schedule their own work thread if necessary. In addition to adding callbacks, they can also be removed as otherwise this opens up a way for user-space to allocate kernel memory with no bound (by opening algif_rng descriptors and then closing them). Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-06-09 18:19:39 +08:00
struct random_ready_callback {
struct list_head list;
void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
struct module *owner;
};
random: create add_device_randomness() interface Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). [ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware in question. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2012-07-04 11:16:01 -04:00
extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc). At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals. The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function) is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement, if/then/else branching, etc). To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken). Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(), though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents of the global are just used to mix the pool. Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical hardware will not have the same starting values. Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: expanded commit message and code comments] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 20:41:19 +02:00
#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
{
add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
sizeof(latent_entropy));
}
#else
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
#endif
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and variables. If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then the plugin will initialize it with random contents. The variable must be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields. These specific functions have been selected because they are init functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of latent entropy. Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: expanded commit message] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 20:42:34 +02:00
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
random: Add callback API for random pool readiness The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way of calling it from within the kernel. This patch replaces it with a callback API instead. The callback is invoked potentially from interrupt context so the user needs to schedule their own work thread if necessary. In addition to adding callbacks, they can also be removed as otherwise this opens up a way for user-space to allocate kernel memory with no bound (by opening algif_rng descriptors and then closing them). Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-06-09 18:19:39 +08:00
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it is avaiable. The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.) It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us to tell for sure. Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed. So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into /dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy pool. This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG anyway. For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG, if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch(). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2012-07-05 10:35:23 -04:00
extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
#ifndef MODULE
[PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 1 Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to these shared resources. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12 00:55:28 -08:00
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
#endif
unsigned int get_random_int(void);
drivers: char: random: add get_random_long() Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR") added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems, but this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32 bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the same as get_random_int(). Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base randomization. Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where appropriate. This patch (of 2): Add get_random_long(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-26 15:19:34 -08:00
unsigned long get_random_long(void);
random: simplify API for random address requests To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and check for a zero return value. For the current callers, the only way to get zero returned is if end <= start. Since they are all adding a constant to the start address, this is unnecessary. We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start + range). While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/. No current call site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range requests are < UINT_MAX. However, we should match caller expectations to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future. All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address if randomize_range() failed. Therefore, we simplify things by just returning the start address on error. randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted over to randomize_addr(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160803233913.32511-2-jason@lakedaemon.net Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-11 13:53:52 -07:00
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modules This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator that can give the same result every time it is initialized. For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we boot or the link comes up. A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base kernel, but only in the module that uses it. Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-26 14:44:13 -07:00
/*
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-31 07:51:14 +02:00
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
* users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
* for legacy reasons.
lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modules This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator that can give the same result every time it is initialized. For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we boot or the link comes up. A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base kernel, but only in the module that uses it. Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-26 14:44:13 -07:00
*/
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-07-31 07:51:14 +02:00
#include <linux/prandom.h>
lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modules This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator that can give the same result every time it is initialized. For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we boot or the link comes up. A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base kernel, but only in the module that uses it. Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-26 14:44:13 -07:00
random: Add support for architectural random hooks Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
2011-07-31 13:54:50 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
random: Add support for architectural random hooks Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
2011-07-31 13:54:50 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
random: Add support for architectural random hooks Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
2011-07-31 13:54:50 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
random: Add arch_has_random[_seed]() Add predicate functions for having arch_get_random[_seed]*(). The only current use is to avoid the loop in arch_random_refill() when arch_get_random_seed_long() is unavailable. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2014-03-17 16:36:30 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
x86, random: Enable the RDSEED instruction Upcoming Intel silicon adds a new RDSEED instruction, which is similar to RDRAND but provides a stronger guarantee: unlike RDRAND, RDSEED will always reseed the PRNG from the true random number source between each read. Thus, the output of RDSEED is guaranteed to be 100% entropic, unlike RDRAND which is only architecturally guaranteed to be 1/512 entropic (although in practice is much more.) The RDSEED instruction takes the same time to execute as RDRAND, but RDSEED unlike RDRAND can legitimately return failure (CF=0) due to entropy exhaustion if too many threads on too many cores are hammering the RDSEED instruction at the same time. Therefore, we have to be more conservative and only use it in places where we can tolerate failures. This patch introduces the primitives arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() but does not use it yet. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2014-03-17 16:36:27 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
x86, random: Enable the RDSEED instruction Upcoming Intel silicon adds a new RDSEED instruction, which is similar to RDRAND but provides a stronger guarantee: unlike RDRAND, RDSEED will always reseed the PRNG from the true random number source between each read. Thus, the output of RDSEED is guaranteed to be 100% entropic, unlike RDRAND which is only architecturally guaranteed to be 1/512 entropic (although in practice is much more.) The RDSEED instruction takes the same time to execute as RDRAND, but RDSEED unlike RDRAND can legitimately return failure (CF=0) due to entropy exhaustion if too many threads on too many cores are hammering the RDSEED instruction at the same time. Therefore, we have to be more conservative and only use it in places where we can tolerate failures. This patch introduces the primitives arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() but does not use it yet. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2014-03-17 16:36:27 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
x86, asm: use bool for bitops and other assembly outputs The gcc people have confirmed that using "bool" when combined with inline assembly always is treated as a byte-sized operand that can be assumed to be 0 or 1, which is exactly what the SET instruction emits. Change the output types and intermediate variables of as many operations as practical to "bool". Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-3-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2016-06-08 12:38:38 -07:00
static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
random: Add arch_has_random[_seed]() Add predicate functions for having arch_get_random[_seed]*(). The only current use is to avoid the loop in arch_random_refill() when arch_get_random_seed_long() is unavailable. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2014-03-17 16:36:30 -07:00
{
return 0;
}
random: Add support for architectural random hooks Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
2011-07-31 13:54:50 -07:00
#endif
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
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