android_kernel_sony_sdm845/lib/Makefile

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#
# Makefile for some libs needed in the kernel.
#
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
ORIG_CFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS)
KBUILD_CFLAGS = $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(ORIG_CFLAGS))
endif
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 14:27:30 -07:00
# These files are disabled because they produce lots of non-interesting and/or
# flaky coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. For example,
# rbtree can be global and individual rotations don't correlate with inputs.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_string.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rbtree.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o timerqueue.o\
idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \
BACKPORT, FROMGIT: crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds. The justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support". The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same. Therefore, remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc. that will be shared by all ChaCha versions. Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously chacha20_ctx). The generic code then passes the round count through to chacha_block(). There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same. I decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (cherry picked from commit 1ca1b917940c24ca3d1f490118c5474168622953 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git master) Conflicts: arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c drivers/char/random.c drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c drivers/crypto/caam/compat.h include/crypto/chacha20.h lib/Makefile Bug: 112008522 Test: As series, see Ic61c13b53facfd2173065be715a7ee5f3af8760b Change-Id: I7fa203ddc7095ce8675a32f49b8a5230cd0cf5f6 Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2018-11-16 17:26:21 -08:00
sha1.o chacha.o md5.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
UPSTREAM: siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast, and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG chaining. For the first usage: There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant as a replacement for jhash in these cases. There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate. While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage poses a real security risk. For the second usage: A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers. SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5 in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy. Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of problems, and it's time we catch-up. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 2c956a60778cbb6a27e0c7a8a52a91378c90e1d1) Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com> Bug: 78533979 Test: Build and boot cuttlefish Change-Id: I4f796f1f4db687c51e97c4dc0a555bdc44f22a50
2017-01-08 13:54:00 +01:00
earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o \
nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o
[PATCH] Add initial implementation of klist helpers. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Signed-off-by: Patrick Mochel <mochel@digitalimplant.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> diff -Nru a/include/linux/klist.h b/include/linux/klist.h
2005-03-21 11:45:16 -08:00
lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
lib-$(CONFIG_HAS_DMA) += dma-noop.o
lib-y += kobject.o klist.o
obj-y += lockref.o
lib: Ignore kasan errors from find_next_bit and last bit find_next_bit and find_last_bit code operates on the unsigned long *addr, and without knowing the size of the actual buffer passed to it, Kasan detects it as invalid Out of Bound read access. find_next_bit and find_last_bit implementation is very generic and it need not to be modified for the Kasan, so we are skipping it from the sanitization. Following is the Kasan error log for the reference. [ 1.262524] BUG: KASan: out of bounds access in find_next_bit+0xa4/0xf0 at addr ffffffc00e9af260 [ 1.262534] Read of size 8 by task swapper/0/1 [ 1.262546] page:ffffffbc00920d60 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 [ 1.262554] page flags: 0x0() [ 1.262570] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.10.49-gef71b0c-00348-g4f06d68-dirty #160 [ 1.262577] Call trace: [ 1.262594] [<ffffffc00040a2d4>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d4 [ 1.262610] [<ffffffc00040a4b8>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c [ 1.262625] [<ffffffc000face70>] dump_stack+0x1c/0x28 [ 1.262641] [<ffffffc000552448>] kasan_report_error+0x294/0x3e4 [ 1.262656] [<ffffffc0005526a8>] kasan_report+0x68/0x78 [ 1.262671] [<ffffffc00055169c>] __asan_load8+0x90/0x9c [ 1.262686] [<ffffffc00076fff8>] find_next_bit+0xa0/0xf0 [ 1.262701] [<ffffffc000de37d0>] bam_pipe_set_desc_write_offset+0xc8/0x378 [ 1.262716] [<ffffffc000e005e4>] sps_bam_pipe_transfer_one+0x6b8/0x70c [ 1.262730] [<ffffffc000e04f84>] sps_transfer_one+0x230/0x298 [ 1.262746] [<ffffffc000da4c58>] ipa_replenish_rx_cache+0x2e8/0x430 [ 1.262762] [<ffffffc000da891c>] ipa_setup_sys_pipe+0x14a8/0x22bc [ 1.262779] [<ffffffc000d8a554>] ipa_setup_apps_pipes+0x580/0x6a0 [ 1.262797] [<ffffffc000d91ef0>] ipa_init.constprop.8+0x134c/0x1dd4 [ 1.262814] [<ffffffc000d93038>] ipa_plat_drv_probe+0x6c0/0x720 [ 1.262829] [<ffffffc0009b51e0>] platform_drv_probe+0x2c/0x3c [ 1.262842] [<ffffffc0009b32d0>] driver_probe_device+0x1f4/0x47c [ 1.262856] [<ffffffc0009b3644>] __driver_attach+0x88/0xc0 [ 1.262873] [<ffffffc0009b05b4>] bus_for_each_dev+0xdc/0x11c [ 1.262886] [<ffffffc0009b2a2c>] driver_attach+0x2c/0x3c [ 1.262903] [<ffffffc0009b237c>] bus_add_driver+0x1bc/0x32c [ 1.262916] [<ffffffc0009b3eb0>] driver_register+0x10c/0x1d8 [ 1.262931] [<ffffffc0009b5a28>] platform_driver_register+0x98/0xa8 [ 1.262946] [<ffffffc0018422d4>] ipa_module_init+0x3c/0x48 [ 1.262960] [<ffffffc000400b08>] do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x188 [ 1.262978] [<ffffffc001800bd0>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c0/0x264 [ 1.262992] [<ffffffc000f9f338>] kernel_init+0x10/0xcc [ 1.263000] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1.263012] ffffffc00e9af100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 1.263024] ffffffc00e9af180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 1.263037] >ffffffc00e9af200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 [ 1.263046] ^ [ 1.263058] ffffffc00e9af280: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4 f4 [ 1.263071] ffffffc00e9af300: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 1.263079] ================================================================== Change-Id: I7b7bde5f408dc1f04a773b7a314662ec91344a5e Signed-off-by: Patrick Daly <pdaly@codeaurora.org>
2015-05-19 19:28:50 -07:00
KASAN_SANITIZE_find_bit.o := n
obj-y += bcd.o div64.o sort.o parser.o halfmd4.o debug_locks.o random32.o \
bust_spinlocks.o kasprintf.o bitmap.o scatterlist.o \
gcd.o lcm.o list_sort.o uuid.o flex_array.o iov_iter.o clz_ctz.o \
bsearch.o find_bit.o llist.o memweight.o kfifo.o \
percpu-refcount.o percpu_ida.o rhashtable.o reciprocal_div.o \
BACKPORT: locking/refcount: Create unchecked atomic_t implementation Many subsystems will not use refcount_t unless there is a way to build the kernel so that there is no regression in speed compared to atomic_t. This adds CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL to enable the full refcount_t implementation which has the validation but is slightly slower. When not enabled, refcount_t uses the basic unchecked atomic_t routines, which results in no code changes compared to just using atomic_t directly. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621200026.GA115679@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Add missing kernel.h header to have UINT_MAX defined Fix header dependency. Suggested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487855374-21993-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1489160052-20293-1-git-send-email-dwindsor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Change WARN() to WARN_ONCE() Linus noticed that the new refcount.h APIs used WARN(), which would turn into a dmesg DoS if it triggers frequently on some buggy driver. So make sure we only warn once. These warnings are never supposed to happen, so it's typically not a problem to lose subsequent warnings. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzbYUTZ=oqZ2YgDjY0C2_n6ODhTfqj6V+m5xWmDxsuB0w@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Use atomic_try_cmpxchg() Generates better code (GCC-6.2.1): text filename 1576 defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.pre 1488 defconfig-build/lib/refcount.o.post Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: refcount: change EXPORT_SYMBOL markings Now that kref is using the refcount apis, the _GPL markings are getting exported to places that it previously wasn't. Now kref.h is GPLv2 licensed, so any non-GPL code using it better be talking to some lawyers, but changing api markings isn't considered "nice", so let's fix this up. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything Linus asked to please make this real C code. And since size then isn't an issue what so ever anymore, remove the debug knob and make all WARN()s unconditional. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dwindsor@gmail.com Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ishkamiel@gmail.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Remove the half-implemented refcount_sub() API CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y (correctly) does not provide a refcount_sub(), which should not be part of proper refcount design patterns. Remove the erroneous extern and the later !CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL accidental implementation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 29dee3c03abc ("locking/refcounts: Out-of-line everything") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170701180129.GA17405@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely. Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable: http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016 This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent. On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated). On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine. Example assembly comparison: refcount_inc() before: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) refcount_inc() after: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3 ... .text.unlikely: ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad) These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast): 2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s: cycles protections atomic_t 82249267387 none refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Implement refcount_dec_and_lock_irqsave() There are in-tree users of refcount_dec_and_lock() which must acquire the spin lock with interrupts disabled. To workaround the lack of an irqsave variant of refcount_dec_and_lock() they use local_irq_save() at the call site. This causes extra code and creates in some places unneeded long interrupt disabled times. These places need also extra treatment for PREEMPT_RT due to the disconnect of the irq disabling and the lock function. Implement the missing irqsave variant of the function. Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r20180612161621.22645-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de [bigeasy: s@atomic_dec_and_lock@refcount_dec_and_lock@g] UPSTREAM: locking/refcounts: Include fewer headers in <linux/refcount.h> Debloat <linux/refcount.h>'s dependencies: - <linux/kernel.h> is not needed, but <linux/compiler.h> is. - <linux/mutex.h> is not needed, only a forward declaration of "struct mutex". - <linux/spinlock.h> is not needed, <linux/spinlock_types.h> is enough. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20180331220036.GA7676@avx2 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/refcount: Always allow checked forms In many cases, it would be useful to be able to use the full sanity-checked refcount helpers regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, as this would help to avoid duplicate warnings where callers try to sanity-check refcount manipulation. This patch refactors things such that the full refcount helpers were always built, as refcount_${op}_checked(), such that they can be used regardless of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL. This will allow code which *always* wants a checked refcount to opt-in, avoiding the need to duplicate the logic for warnings. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711093607.1644-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg() Add a new cmpxchg interface: bool try_cmpxchg(u{8,16,32,64} *ptr, u{8,16,32,64} *val, u{8,16,32,64} new); Where the boolean returns the result of the compare; and thus if the exchange happened; and in case of failure, the new value of *ptr is returned in *val. This allows simplification/improvement of loops like: for (;;) { new = val $op $imm; old = cmpxchg(ptr, val, new); if (old == val) break; val = old; } into: do { } while (!try_cmpxchg(ptr, &val, val $op $imm)); while also generating better code (GCC6 and onwards). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> UPSTREAM: locking/atomic: Fix atomic_try_cmpxchg() semantics Dmitry noted that the new atomic_try_cmpxchg() primitive is broken when the old pointer doesn't point to the local stack. He writes: "Consider a classical lock-free stack push: node->next = atomic_read(&head); do { } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&head, &node->next, node)); This code is broken with the current implementation, the problem is with unconditional update of *__po. In case of success it writes the same value back into *__po, but in case of cmpxchg success we might have lose ownership of some memory locations and potentially over what __po has pointed to. The same holds for the re-read of *__po. " He also points out that this makes it surprisingly different from the similar C/C++ atomic operation. After investigating the code-gen differences caused by this patch; and a number of alternatives (Linus dislikes this interface lots), we arrived at these results (size x86_64-defconfig/vmlinux): GCC-6.3.0: 10735757 cmpxchg 10726413 try_cmpxchg 10730509 try_cmpxchg + patch 10730445 try_cmpxchg-linus GCC-7 (20170327): 10709514 cmpxchg 10704266 try_cmpxchg 10704266 try_cmpxchg + patch 10704394 try_cmpxchg-linus From this we see that the patch has the advantage of better code-gen on GCC-7 and keeps the interface roughly consistent with the C language variant. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a9ebf306f52c ("locking/atomic: Introduce atomic_try_cmpxchg()") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sorayukii <sorayukii69@gmail.com>
2017-02-10 16:27:52 +01:00
once.o refcount.o
obj-y += string_helpers.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STRING_HELPERS) += test-string_helpers.o
obj-y += hexdump.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HEXDUMP) += test_hexdump.o
obj-y += kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BPF) += test_bpf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FIRMWARE) += test_firmware.o
UPSTREAM: siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast, and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG chaining. For the first usage: There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant as a replacement for jhash in these cases. There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate. While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage poses a real security risk. For the second usage: A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers. SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5 in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy. Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of problems, and it's time we catch-up. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 2c956a60778cbb6a27e0c7a8a52a91378c90e1d1) Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com> Bug: 78533979 Test: Build and boot cuttlefish Change-Id: I4f796f1f4db687c51e97c4dc0a555bdc44f22a50
2017-01-08 13:54:00 +01:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HASH) += test_hash.o test_siphash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KASAN) += test_kasan.o
CFLAGS_test_kasan.o += -fno-builtin
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KSTRTOX) += test-kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LKM) += test_module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_RHASHTABLE) += test_rhashtable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY) += test_user_copy.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_keys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_key_base.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF) += test_printf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITMAP) += test_bitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UUID) += test_uuid.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT),y)
CFLAGS_kobject.o += -DDEBUG
CFLAGS_kobject_uevent.o += -DDEBUG
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED) += debug_info.o
CFLAGS_debug_info.o += $(call cc-option, -femit-struct-debug-detailed=any)
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP) += pci_iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomap_copy.o devres.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE) += check_signature.o
[PATCH] lockdep: locking API self tests Introduce DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS, which uses the generic lock debugging code's silent-failure feature to run a matrix of testcases. There are 210 testcases currently: +----------------------- | Locking API testsuite: +------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ | spin |wlock |rlock |mutex | wsem | rsem | -------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ A-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-A-B-C deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-C-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | double unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | bad unlock order: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ recursive read-lock: | ok | | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ non-nested unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+ hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq read-recursion/123: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/123: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/132: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/132: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/213: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/213: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/231: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/231: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/312: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/312: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/321: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/321: ok | --------------------------------+-----+---------------- Good, all 210 testcases passed! | --------------------------------+ Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 00:24:48 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS) += locking-selftest.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o
Add a generic associative array implementation. Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys. This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies. Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt Some of the properties of the implementation are: (1) Objects are opaque pointers. The implementation does not care where they point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything). [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant bits. (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array. This permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously. Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects. (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value). This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the array itself or its algorithms. (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array. (5) Index keys must be unique. Inserting an object with the same key as one already in the array will replace the old object. (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths. (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to length is seen. (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array. (9) The array can iterated over. The objects will not necessarily come out in key order. (10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the iterator. Note, however, under these circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once. If this is a problem, the iterator should lock against modification. Objects will not be missed, however, unless deleted. (11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key. (12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up. The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed on each level by nibbles from the index key. To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes. Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 10:35:17 +01:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
infrastructure to debug (dynamic) objects We can see an ever repeating problem pattern with objects of any kind in the kernel: 1) freeing of active objects 2) reinitialization of active objects Both problems can be hard to debug because the crash happens at a point where we have no chance to decode the root cause anymore. One problem spot are kernel timers, where the detection of the problem often happens in interrupt context and usually causes the machine to panic. While working on a timer related bug report I had to hack specialized code into the timer subsystem to get a reasonable hint for the root cause. This debug hack was fine for temporary use, but far from a mergeable solution due to the intrusiveness into the timer code. The code further lacked the ability to detect and report the root cause instantly and keep the system operational. Keeping the system operational is important to get hold of the debug information without special debugging aids like serial consoles and special knowledge of the bug reporter. The problems described above are not restricted to timers, but timers tend to expose it usually in a full system crash. Other objects are less explosive, but the symptoms caused by such mistakes can be even harder to debug. Instead of creating specialized debugging code for the timer subsystem a generic infrastructure is created which allows developers to verify their code and provides an easy to enable debug facility for users in case of trouble. The debugobjects core code keeps track of operations on static and dynamic objects by inserting them into a hashed list and sanity checking them on object operations and provides additional checks whenever kernel memory is freed. The tracked object operations are: - initializing an object - adding an object to a subsystem list - deleting an object from a subsystem list Each operation is sanity checked before the operation is executed and the subsystem specific code can provide a fixup function which allows to prevent the damage of the operation. When the sanity check triggers a warning message and a stack trace is printed. The list of operations can be extended if the need arises. For now it's limited to the requirements of the first user (timers). The core code enqueues the objects into hash buckets. The hash index is generated from the address of the object to simplify the lookup for the check on kfree/vfree. Each bucket has it's own spinlock to avoid contention on a global lock. The debug code can be compiled in without being active. The runtime overhead is minimal and could be optimized by asm alternatives. A kernel command line option enables the debugging code. Thanks to Ingo Molnar for review, suggestions and cleanup patches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:55:01 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
ifneq ($(CONFIG_HAVE_DEC_LOCK),y)
lib-y += dec_and_lock.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_BITREVERSE) += bitrev.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RATIONAL) += rational.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_CCITT) += crc-ccitt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC16) += crc16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF)+= crc-t10dif.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T) += crc-itu-t.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32) += crc32.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC7) += crc7.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LIBCRC32C) += libcrc32c.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC8) += crc8.o
UPSTREAM: lib: Add xxhash module Adds xxhash kernel module with xxh32 and xxh64 hashes. xxhash is an extremely fast non-cryptographic hash algorithm for checksumming. The zstd compression and decompression modules added in the next patch require xxhash. I extracted it out from zstd since it is useful on its own. I copied the code from the upstream XXHash source repository and translated it into kernel style. I ran benchmarks and tests in the kernel and tests in userland. I benchmarked xxhash as a special character device. I ran in four modes, no-op, xxh32, xxh64, and crc32. The no-op mode simply copies the data to kernel space and ignores it. The xxh32, xxh64, and crc32 modes compute hashes on the copied data. I also ran it with four different buffer sizes. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd source repository under `contrib/linux-kernel/xxhash_test.c` [1]. I ran the benchmarks on a Ubuntu 14.04 VM with 2 cores and 4 GiB of RAM. The VM is running on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB of RAM, and a SSD. I benchmarked using the file `filesystem.squashfs` from `ubuntu-16.10-desktop-amd64.iso`, which is 1,536,217,088 B large. Run the following commands for the benchmark: modprobe xxhash_test mknod xxhash_test c 245 0 time cp filesystem.squashfs xxhash_test The time is reported by the time of the userland `cp`. The GB/s is computed with 1,536,217,008 B / time(buffer size, hash) which includes the time to copy from userland. The Normalized GB/s is computed with 1,536,217,088 B / (time(buffer size, hash) - time(buffer size, none)). | Buffer Size (B) | Hash | Time (s) | GB/s | Adjusted GB/s | |-----------------|-------|----------|------|---------------| | 1024 | none | 0.408 | 3.77 | - | | 1024 | xxh32 | 0.649 | 2.37 | 6.37 | | 1024 | xxh64 | 0.542 | 2.83 | 11.46 | | 1024 | crc32 | 1.290 | 1.19 | 1.74 | | 4096 | none | 0.380 | 4.04 | - | | 4096 | xxh32 | 0.645 | 2.38 | 5.79 | | 4096 | xxh64 | 0.500 | 3.07 | 12.80 | | 4096 | crc32 | 1.168 | 1.32 | 1.95 | | 8192 | none | 0.351 | 4.38 | - | | 8192 | xxh32 | 0.614 | 2.50 | 5.84 | | 8192 | xxh64 | 0.464 | 3.31 | 13.60 | | 8192 | crc32 | 1.163 | 1.32 | 1.89 | | 16384 | none | 0.346 | 4.43 | - | | 16384 | xxh32 | 0.590 | 2.60 | 6.30 | | 16384 | xxh64 | 0.466 | 3.30 | 12.80 | | 16384 | crc32 | 1.183 | 1.30 | 1.84 | Tested in userland using the test-suite in the zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/XXHashUserlandTest.cpp` [2] by mocking the kernel functions. A line in each branch of every function in `xxhash.c` was commented out to ensure that the test-suite fails. Additionally tested while testing zstd and with SMHasher [3]. [1] https://phabricator.intern.facebook.com/P57526246 [2] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/XXHashUserlandTest.cpp [3] https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher zstd source repository: https://github.com/facebook/zstd XXHash source repository: https://github.com/cyan4973/xxhash Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> (cherry picked from commit 5d2405227a9eaea48e8cc95756a06d407b11f141) Signed-off-by: Peter Kalauskas <peskal@google.com> Bug: 112488418 Change-Id: Icffe9d5edd641795f40137e389672e81967c1842
2017-08-04 13:19:17 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_XXHASH) += xxhash.o
[PATCH] ia64 uncached alloc This patch contains the ia64 uncached page allocator and the generic allocator (genalloc). The uncached allocator was formerly part of the SN2 mspec driver but there are several other users of it so it has been split off from the driver. The generic allocator can be used by device driver to manage special memory etc. The generic allocator is based on the allocator from the sym53c8xx_2 driver. Various users on ia64 needs uncached memory. The SGI SN architecture requires it for inter-partition communication between partitions within a large NUMA cluster. The specific user for this is the XPC code. Another application is large MPI style applications which use it for synchronization, on SN this can be done using special 'fetchop' operations but it also benefits non SN hardware which may use regular uncached memory for this purpose. Performance of doing this through uncached vs cached memory is pretty substantial. This is handled by the mspec driver which I will push out in a seperate patch. Rather than creating a specific allocator for just uncached memory I came up with genalloc which is a generic purpose allocator that can be used by device drivers and other subsystems as they please. For instance to handle onboard device memory. It was derived from the sym53c7xx_2 driver's allocator which is also an example of a potential user (I am refraining from modifying sym2 right now as it seems to have been under fairly heavy development recently). On ia64 memory has various properties within a granule, ie. it isn't safe to access memory as uncached within the same granule as currently has memory accessed in cached mode. The regular system therefore doesn't utilize memory in the lower granules which is mixed in with device PAL code etc. The uncached driver walks the EFI memmap and pulls out the spill uncached pages and sticks them into the uncached pool. Only after these chunks have been utilized, will it start converting regular cached memory into uncached memory. Hence the reason for the EFI related code additions. Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@wildopensource.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-21 17:15:02 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ALLOCATOR) += genalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_842_COMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_842_DECOMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/
obj-$(CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON) += reed_solomon/
lib: add shared BCH ECC library This is a new software BCH encoding/decoding library, similar to the shared Reed-Solomon library. Binary BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) codes are widely used to correct errors in NAND flash devices requiring more than 1-bit ecc correction; they are generally better suited for NAND flash than RS codes because NAND bit errors do not occur in bursts. Latest SLC NAND devices typically require at least 4-bit ecc protection per 512 bytes block. This library provides software encoding/decoding, but may also be used with ASIC/SoC hardware BCH engines to perform error correction. It is being currently used for this purpose on an OMAP3630 board (4bit/8bit HW BCH). It has also been used to decode raw dumps of NAND devices with on-die BCH ecc engines (e.g. Micron 4bit ecc SLC devices). Latest NAND devices (including SLC) can exhibit high error rates (typically a dozen or more bitflips per hour during stress tests); in order to minimize the performance impact of error correction, this library implements recently developed algorithms for fast polynomial root finding (see bch.c header for details) instead of the traditional exhaustive Chien root search; a few performance figures are provided below: Platform: arm926ejs @ 468 MHz, 32 KiB icache, 16 KiB dcache BCH ecc : 4-bit per 512 bytes Encoding average throughput: 250 Mbits/s Error correction time (compared with Chien search): average worst average (Chien) worst (Chien) ---------------------------------------------------------- 1 bit 8.5 µs 11 µs 200 µs 383 µs 2 bit 9.7 µs 12.5 µs 477 µs 728 µs 3 bit 18.1 µs 20.6 µs 758 µs 1010 µs 4 bit 19.5 µs 23 µs 1028 µs 1280 µs In the above figures, "worst" is meant in terms of error pattern, not in terms of cache miss / page faults effects (not taken into account here). The library has been extensively tested on the following platforms: x86, x86_64, arm926ejs, omap3630, qemu-ppc64, qemu-mips. Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2011-03-11 11:05:32 +01:00
obj-$(CONFIG_BCH) += bch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS) += lzo/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS) += lzo/
lib: add lz4 compressor module This patchset is for supporting LZ4 compression and the crypto API using it. As shown below, the size of data is a little bit bigger but compressing speed is faster under the enabled unaligned memory access. We can use lz4 de/compression through crypto API as well. Also, It will be useful for another potential user of lz4 compression. lz4 Compression Benchmark: Compiler: ARM gcc 4.6.4 ARMv7, 1 GHz based board Kernel: linux 3.4 Uncompressed data Size: 101 MB Compressed Size compression Speed LZO 72.1MB 32.1MB/s, 33.0MB/s(UA) LZ4 75.1MB 30.4MB/s, 35.9MB/s(UA) LZ4HC 59.8MB 2.4MB/s, 2.5MB/s(UA) - UA: Unaligned memory Access support - Latest patch set for LZO applied This patch: Add support for LZ4 compression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Compression APIs for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet and were changed for kernel coding style. LZ4 homepage : http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html LZ4 source repository : http://code.google.com/p/lz4/ svn revision : r90 Two APIs are added: lz4_compress() support basic lz4 compression whereas lz4hc_compress() support high compression or CPU performance get lower but compression ratio get higher. Also, we require the pre-allocated working memory with the defined size and destination buffer must be allocated with the size of lz4_compressbound. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lz4_compresshcctx() static] Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bob Pearson <rpearson@systemfabricworks.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au> Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com> Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-08 16:01:49 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_COMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_DECOMPRESS) += lz4/
UPSTREAM: lib: Add zstd modules Add zstd compression and decompression kernel modules. zstd offers a wide varity of compression speed and quality trade-offs. It can compress at speeds approaching lz4, and quality approaching lzma. zstd decompressions at speeds more than twice as fast as zlib, and decompression speed remains roughly the same across all compression levels. The code was ported from the upstream zstd source repository. The `linux/zstd.h` header was modified to match linux kernel style. The cross-platform and allocation code was stripped out. Instead zstd requires the caller to pass a preallocated workspace. The source files were clang-formatted [1] to match the Linux Kernel style as much as possible. Otherwise, the code was unmodified. We would like to avoid as much further manual modification to the source code as possible, so it will be easier to keep the kernel zstd up to date. I benchmarked zstd compression as a special character device. I ran zstd and zlib compression at several levels, as well as performing no compression, which measure the time spent copying the data to kernel space. Data is passed to the compresser 4096 B at a time. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd source repository under `contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_compress_test.c` [2]. I ran the benchmarks on a Ubuntu 14.04 VM with 2 cores and 4 GiB of RAM. The VM is running on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB of RAM, and a SSD. I benchmarked using `silesia.tar` [3], which is 211,988,480 B large. Run the following commands for the benchmark: sudo modprobe zstd_compress_test sudo mknod zstd_compress_test c 245 0 sudo cp silesia.tar zstd_compress_test The time is reported by the time of the userland `cp`. The MB/s is computed with 1,536,217,008 B / time(buffer size, hash) which includes the time to copy from userland. The Adjusted MB/s is computed with 1,536,217,088 B / (time(buffer size, hash) - time(buffer size, none)). The memory reported is the amount of memory the compressor requests. | Method | Size (B) | Time (s) | Ratio | MB/s | Adj MB/s | Mem (MB) | |----------|----------|----------|-------|---------|----------|----------| | none | 11988480 | 0.100 | 1 | 2119.88 | - | - | | zstd -1 | 73645762 | 1.044 | 2.878 | 203.05 | 224.56 | 1.23 | | zstd -3 | 66988878 | 1.761 | 3.165 | 120.38 | 127.63 | 2.47 | | zstd -5 | 65001259 | 2.563 | 3.261 | 82.71 | 86.07 | 2.86 | | zstd -10 | 60165346 | 13.242 | 3.523 | 16.01 | 16.13 | 13.22 | | zstd -15 | 58009756 | 47.601 | 3.654 | 4.45 | 4.46 | 21.61 | | zstd -19 | 54014593 | 102.835 | 3.925 | 2.06 | 2.06 | 60.15 | | zlib -1 | 77260026 | 2.895 | 2.744 | 73.23 | 75.85 | 0.27 | | zlib -3 | 72972206 | 4.116 | 2.905 | 51.50 | 52.79 | 0.27 | | zlib -6 | 68190360 | 9.633 | 3.109 | 22.01 | 22.24 | 0.27 | | zlib -9 | 67613382 | 22.554 | 3.135 | 9.40 | 9.44 | 0.27 | I benchmarked zstd decompression using the same method on the same machine. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_decompress_test.c` [4]. The memory reported is the amount of memory required to decompress data compressed with the given compression level. If you know the maximum size of your input, you can reduce the memory usage of decompression irrespective of the compression level. | Method | Time (s) | MB/s | Adjusted MB/s | Memory (MB) | |----------|----------|---------|---------------|-------------| | none | 0.025 | 8479.54 | - | - | | zstd -1 | 0.358 | 592.15 | 636.60 | 0.84 | | zstd -3 | 0.396 | 535.32 | 571.40 | 1.46 | | zstd -5 | 0.396 | 535.32 | 571.40 | 1.46 | | zstd -10 | 0.374 | 566.81 | 607.42 | 2.51 | | zstd -15 | 0.379 | 559.34 | 598.84 | 4.61 | | zstd -19 | 0.412 | 514.54 | 547.77 | 8.80 | | zlib -1 | 0.940 | 225.52 | 231.68 | 0.04 | | zlib -3 | 0.883 | 240.08 | 247.07 | 0.04 | | zlib -6 | 0.844 | 251.17 | 258.84 | 0.04 | | zlib -9 | 0.837 | 253.27 | 287.64 | 0.04 | Tested in userland using the test-suite in the zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/UserlandTest.cpp` [5] by mocking the kernel functions. Fuzz tested using libfuzzer [6] with the fuzz harnesses under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/{RoundTripCrash.c,DecompressCrash.c}` [7] [8] with ASAN, UBSAN, and MSAN. Additionaly, it was tested while testing the BtrFS and SquashFS patches coming next. [1] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangFormat.html [2] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_compress_test.c [3] http://sun.aei.polsl.pl/~sdeor/index.php?page=silesia [4] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_decompress_test.c [5] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/UserlandTest.cpp [6] http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html [7] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/RoundTripCrash.c [8] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/DecompressCrash.c zstd source repository: https://github.com/facebook/zstd Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> (cherry picked from commit 73f3d1b48f5069d46ba48aa28c2898dc93185560) Signed-off-by: Peter Kalauskas <peskal@google.com> Bug: 112488418 Change-Id: I6321071707a322683a4b35d047e7410c5a67acdc
2017-08-09 19:35:53 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSTD_COMPRESS) += zstd/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSTD_DECOMPRESS) += zstd/
obj-$(CONFIG_XZ_DEC) += xz/
obj-$(CONFIG_RAID6_PQ) += raid6/
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_GZIP) += decompress_inflate.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_BZIP2) += decompress_bunzip2.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZMA) += decompress_unlzma.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_XZ) += decompress_unxz.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZO) += decompress_unlzo.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZ4) += decompress_unlz4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH) += textsearch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_KMP) += ts_kmp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_BM) += ts_bm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_FSM) += ts_fsm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += percpu_counter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_GENERIC) += audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC) += compat_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SWIOTLB) += swiotlb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_HELPER) += iommu-helper.o iommu-common.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION) += fault-inject.o
fault-injection: notifier error injection This patchset provides kernel modules that can be used to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures by injecting artifical errors to the following notifier chain callbacks. * CPU notifier * PM notifier * memory hotplug notifier * powerpc pSeries reconfig notifier Example: Inject CPU offline error (-1 == -EPERM) # cd /sys/kernel/debug/notifier-error-inject/cpu # echo -1 > actions/CPU_DOWN_PREPARE/error # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted The patchset also adds cpu and memory hotplug tests to tools/testing/selftests These tests first do simple online and offline test and then do fault injection tests if notifier error injection module is available. This patch: The notifier error injection provides the ability to inject artifical errors to specified notifier chain callbacks. It is useful to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures. This adds common basic functions to define which type of events can be fail and to initialize the debugfs interface to control what error code should be returned and which event should be failed. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-30 14:43:02 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECTION) += notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += cpu-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PM_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += pm-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETDEV_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += netdev-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += memory-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OF_RECONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += \
of-reconfig-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION) += error-inject.o
[PATCH] Generic BUG implementation This patch adds common handling for kernel BUGs, for use by architectures as they wish. The code is derived from arch/powerpc. The advantages of having common BUG handling are: - consistent BUG reporting across architectures - shared implementation of out-of-line file/line data - implement CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE consistently This means that in inline impact of BUG is just the illegal instruction itself, which is an improvement for i386 and x86-64. A BUG is represented in the instruction stream as an illegal instruction, which has file/line information associated with it. This extra information is stored in the __bug_table section in the ELF file. When the kernel gets an illegal instruction, it first confirms it might possibly be from a BUG (ie, in kernel mode, the right illegal instruction). It then calls report_bug(). This searches __bug_table for a matching instruction pointer, and if found, prints the corresponding file/line information. If report_bug() determines that it wasn't a BUG which caused the trap, it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE. Some architectures (powerpc) implement WARN using the same mechanism; if the illegal instruction was the result of a WARN, then report_bug(Q) returns CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE; otherwise it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG. lib/bug.c keeps a list of loaded modules which can be searched for __bug_table entries. The architecture must call module_bug_finalize()/module_bug_cleanup() from its corresponding module_finalize/cleanup functions. Unsetting CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE will reduce the kernel size by some amount. At the very least, filename and line information will not be recorded for each but, but architectures may decide to store no extra information per BUG at all. Unfortunately, gcc doesn't have a general way to mark an asm() as noreturn, so architectures will generally have to include an infinite loop (or similar) in the BUG code, so that gcc knows execution won't continue beyond that point. gcc does have a __builtin_trap() operator which may be useful to achieve the same effect, unfortunately it cannot be used to actually implement the BUG itself, because there's no way to get the instruction's address for use in generating the __bug_table entry. [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: Handle BUG=n, GENERIC_BUG=n to prevent build errors] [bunk@stusta.de: include/linux/bug.h must always #include <linux/module.h] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Hugh Dickens <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 02:36:19 -08:00
lib-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG) += bug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK) += syscall.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) += dynamic_debug.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 16:46:19 -04:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NLATTR) += nlattr.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 16:46:19 -04:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LRU_CACHE) += lru_cache.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG) += dma-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM) += checksum.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64) += atomic64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ATOMIC64_SELFTEST) += atomic64_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_RMAP) += cpu_rmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CORDIC) += cordic.o
dql: Dynamic queue limits Implementation of dynamic queue limits (dql). This is a libary which allows a queue limit to be dynamically managed. The goal of dql is to set the queue limit, number of objects to the queue, to be minimized without allowing the queue to be starved. dql would be used with a queue which has these properties: 1) Objects are queued up to some limit which can be expressed as a count of objects. 2) Periodically a completion process executes which retires consumed objects. 3) Starvation occurs when limit has been reached, all queued data has actually been consumed but completion processing has not yet run, so queuing new data is blocked. 4) Minimizing the amount of queued data is desirable. A canonical example of such a queue would be a NIC HW transmit queue. The queue limit is dynamic, it will increase or decrease over time depending on the workload. The queue limit is recalculated each time completion processing is done. Increases occur when the queue is starved and can exponentially increase over successive intervals. Decreases occur when more data is being maintained in the queue than needed to prevent starvation. The number of extra objects, or "slack", is measured over successive intervals, and to avoid hysteresis the limit is only reduced by the miminum slack seen over a configurable time period. dql API provides routines to manage the queue: - dql_init is called to intialize the dql structure - dql_reset is called to reset dynamic values - dql_queued called when objects are being enqueued - dql_avail returns availability in the queue - dql_completed is called when objects have be consumed in the queue Configuration consists of: - max_limit, maximum limit - min_limit, minimum limit - slack_hold_time, time to measure instances of slack before reducing queue limit Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-28 16:32:35 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DQL) += dynamic_queue_limits.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GLOB) += glob.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MPILIB) += mpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
lib-$(CONFIG_CLZ_TAB) += clz_tab.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DDR) += jedec_ddr_data.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER) += strncpy_from_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER) += strnlen_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_NET_UTILS) += net_utils.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_SPLIT) += sg_split.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_POOL) += sg_pool.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE) += stmp_device.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_POLL) += irq_poll.o
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 14:22:08 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKDEPOT) += stackdepot.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackdepot.o := n
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 14:22:08 -07:00
libfdt_files = fdt.o fdt_ro.o fdt_wip.o fdt_rw.o fdt_sw.o fdt_strerror.o \
fdt_empty_tree.o
$(foreach file, $(libfdt_files), \
$(eval CFLAGS_$(file) = -I$(src)/../scripts/dtc/libfdt))
lib-$(CONFIG_LIBFDT) += $(libfdt_files)
obj-$(CONFIG_RBTREE_TEST) += rbtree_test.o
rbtree: add prio tree and interval tree tests Patch 1 implements support for interval trees, on top of the augmented rbtree API. It also adds synthetic tests to compare the performance of interval trees vs prio trees. Short answers is that interval trees are slightly faster (~25%) on insert/erase, and much faster (~2.4 - 3x) on search. It is debatable how realistic the synthetic test is, and I have not made such measurements yet, but my impression is that interval trees would still come out faster. Patch 2 uses a preprocessor template to make the interval tree generic, and uses it as a replacement for the vma prio_tree. Patch 3 takes the other prio_tree user, kmemleak, and converts it to use a basic rbtree. We don't actually need the augmented rbtree support here because the intervals are always non-overlapping. Patch 4 removes the now-unused prio tree library. Patch 5 proposes an additional optimization to rb_erase_augmented, now providing it as an inline function so that the augmented callbacks can be inlined in. This provides an additional 5-10% performance improvement for the interval tree insert/erase benchmark. There is a maintainance cost as it exposes augmented rbtree users to some of the rbtree library internals; however I think this cost shouldn't be too high as I expect the augmented rbtree will always have much less users than the base rbtree. I should probably add a quick summary of why I think it makes sense to replace prio trees with augmented rbtree based interval trees now. One of the drivers is that we need augmented rbtrees for Rik's vma gap finding code, and once you have them, it just makes sense to use them for interval trees as well, as this is the simpler and more well known algorithm. prio trees, in comparison, seem *too* clever: they impose an additional 'heap' constraint on the tree, which they use to guarantee a faster worst-case complexity of O(k+log N) for stabbing queries in a well-balanced prio tree, vs O(k*log N) for interval trees (where k=number of matches, N=number of intervals). Now this sounds great, but in practice prio trees don't realize this theorical benefit. First, the additional constraint makes them harder to update, so that the kernel implementation has to simplify things by balancing them like a radix tree, which is not always ideal. Second, the fact that there are both index and heap properties makes both tree manipulation and search more complex, which results in a higher multiplicative time constant. As it turns out, the simple interval tree algorithm ends up running faster than the more clever prio tree. This patch: Add two test modules: - prio_tree_test measures the performance of lib/prio_tree.c, both for insertion/removal and for stabbing searches - interval_tree_test measures the performance of a library of equivalent functionality, built using the augmented rbtree support. In order to support the second test module, lib/interval_tree.c is introduced. It is kept separate from the interval_tree_test main file for two reasons: first we don't want to provide an unfair advantage over prio_tree_test by having everything in a single compilation unit, and second there is the possibility that the interval tree functionality could get some non-test users in kernel over time. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-08 16:31:23 -07:00
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table
clean-files := crc32table.h
$(obj)/crc32.o: $(obj)/crc32table.h
quiet_cmd_crc32 = GEN $@
cmd_crc32 = $< > $@
$(obj)/crc32table.h: $(obj)/gen_crc32table
$(call cmd,crc32)
#
# Build a fast OID lookip registry from include/linux/oid_registry.h
#
obj-$(CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY) += oid_registry.o
$(obj)/oid_registry.o: $(obj)/oid_registry_data.c
$(obj)/oid_registry_data.c: $(srctree)/include/linux/oid_registry.h \
$(src)/build_OID_registry
$(call cmd,build_OID_registry)
quiet_cmd_build_OID_registry = GEN $@
cmd_build_OID_registry = perl $(srctree)/$(src)/build_OID_registry $< $@
clean-files += oid_registry_data.c
obj-$(CONFIG_UCS2_STRING) += ucs2_string.o
UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checker UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior (UB). Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before operations that could cause UB. If check fails (i.e. UB detected) __ubsan_handle_* function called to print error message. So the most of the work is done by compiler. This patch just implements ubsan handlers printing errors. GCC has this capability since 4.9.x [1] (see -fsanitize=undefined option and its suboptions). However GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2]. Article [3] has a bit more details about UBSAN in the GCC. [1] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [2] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [3] - http://developerblog.redhat.com/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan/ Issues which UBSAN has found thus far are: Found bugs: * out-of-bounds access - 97840cb67ff5 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind") undefined shifts: * d48458d4a768 ("jbd2: use a better hash function for the revoke table") * 10632008b9e1 ("clockevents: Prevent shift out of bounds") * 'x << -1' shift in ext4 - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<5444EF21.8020501@samsung.com> * undefined rol32(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449198241-20654-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * undefined dirty_ratelimit calculation - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<566594E2.3050306@odin.com> * undefined roundown_pow_of_two(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449156616-11474-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * [WONTFIX] undefined shift in __bpf_prog_run - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+ZxoR3UjLgcNdUm4fECLMx2VdtfrENMtRRCdgHB2n0bJA@mail.gmail.com> WONTFIX here because it should be fixed in bpf program, not in kernel. signed overflows: * 32a8df4e0b33f ("sched: Fix odd values in effective_load() calculations") * mul overflow in ntp - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449175608-1146-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * incorrect conversion into rtc_time in rtc_time64_to_tm() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449187944-11730-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * unvalidated timespec in io_getevents() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+bBxVYLQ6LtOKrKtnLthqLHcw-BMp3aqP3mjdAvr9FULQ@mail.gmail.com> * [NOTABUG] signed overflow in ktime_add_safe() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+aJ4muRnWxsUe1CMnA6P8nooO33kwG-c8YZg=0Xc8rJqw@mail.gmail.com> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused local warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __int128 build woes] Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Yury Gribov <y.gribov@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 15:00:55 -08:00
obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
ubsan: build ubsan.c more conservatively commit af700eaed0564d5d3963a7a51cb0843629d7fe3d upstream. objtool points out several conditions that it does not like, depending on the combination with other configuration options and compiler variants: stack protector: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0xbf: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0xbe: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled stackleak plugin: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled kasan: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled The stackleak and kasan options just need to be disabled for this file as we do for other files already. For the stack protector, we already attempt to disable it, but this fails on clang because the check is mixed with the gcc specific -fno-conserve-stack option. According to Andrey Ryabinin, that option is not even needed, dropping it here fixes the stackprotector issue. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722125139.1335385-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190617123109.667090-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190722091050.2188664-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/ Fixes: d08965a27e84 ("x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-02 21:48:58 -07:00
KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
CFLAGS_ubsan.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_QMI_ENCDEC) += qmi_encdec.o
obj-y += crypto/